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THE CONSTITUTIONAL VULNERABILITY OF
AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT: THE POLITICS OF
CITY STATUS IN AMERICAN LAW
JOAN C. WILLIAMS*
Unlike federal and state governments, American cities have no set place in the
American constitutional structure. Consequently, courts and commentators have
been able to define the scope of city sovereignty without the constitutional constraints
that limit the scope of federal and state power. In this Article, Professor Joan Wil-
liams shows that courts and commentators have defined city status by incorporating
their individual political beliefs into municipal law. Focusing primarily on the theo-
ries of Thomas M. Cooley, John F. Dillon, Justice William Brennan and the Burger
Court's conservative majority, the Article shows how each theory resulted from its
author's fears of excessive governmental power. The Article also shows that Gerald
Frug's influential article The City as a Legal Concept can be viewed as yet another
example of how commentators have used the issue of city status as a proxy for their
political views. Professor Williams concludes that questions of city authority and
liability should be determined by reference to cities' resources and responsibilities,
rather than by agendas concerning governmental power in general.
Recent Supreme Court cases have suggested that cities and other
local units' have some measure of local sovereignty.2 These cases ap-
pear to contradict the traditional definition of cities as mere subdivi-
sions of the state, with no inherent sovereignty.3
* Associate Professor of Law, American University-Washington College of Law. J.D.,
Harvard University; Master of City Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. For
comments on prior drafts, I am grateful to Burton D. Weschler, Hendrik Hartog, James X.
Dempsey, Judith W. Wegner, James P. May and to Norman Williams, to whom this article is
dedicated on the occasion of his seventieth birthday. Sally Schiller gave invaluable research
assistance. This research was generously supported by the American University Law School
Research Fund.
1. Cities, towns and other general-purpose local government units have the same legal
status as do counties and the wide variety of water, fire, school and other special-purpose units
called "special districts." No single term is available to describe all local government units with
identical legal status; I have used "municipalities" and "localities" interchangeably to do so. See
infra note 138. This terminological maneuver is not meant to imply that the practice of lumping
together these disparate entities into one legal category is logical. It isn't. See infra note 366 and
accompanying text.
2. See Gelfand, The Burger Court and the New Federalism: Preliminary Reflections on
the Roles of Local Government Actors in the Political Dramas of the 1980s, 21 B.C.L. REV. 763, 789
(1980) (documenting a consistent pattern of Supreme Court deference to local government
decisionmaking). Gelfand uses similar terminology in his article ("quasi constitutional doctrine of
community self-determination," id. at 837, "quasi constitutional principle of self-rule," id. at 847.)
See also Lee, The Federal Courts and the Status of Municipalities, 62 B.U.L. Rav. 1, 51-68 (1982)
(documenting emergence of a concept of community autonomy).
3. C. ANTIEAU, 1 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 1.01 (1985).
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The traditional version of municipal law was crystallized in the late
nineteenth century by John F. Dillon.4 Dillon, an early corporate law-
yer, had an abiding faith in the market system and a consequent con-
cern to limit the scope of governmental power,5 both notions central to
modern-day conservatism. 6 Yet the conservative Burger Court major-
ity has reached a conclusion opposite from Dillon's on the basic princi-
ple of city power. Whereas Dillon strove to limit city power by arguing
that cities had no inherent sovereignty, the Burger Court majority has
exalted the power of localities through the principle of local govern-
ment sovereignty. The current Supfeme Court Justice whose opinions
stress cities' lack of inherent sovereignty is Justice William Brennan,
who would be as uncomfortable with the political philosophy of John
Dillon as he is with that of Justices Burger and Rehnquist.'
This Article analyzes this confusing pattern. In doing so, it offers
several insights into contemporary constitutional law. It shows first
that the Supreme Court is proceeding on two inconsistent theories in
recent cases in which localities play a central role. One set of opinions-
Justice Brennan's opinions expanding municipal liability in section
1983,8 antitrust9 and inverse condemnation suits' ° -are premised on
the idea that cities lack inherent sovereignty. In striking contrast, deci-
sions of the conservative majority, including San Antonio v. Rodri-
guez" and Milliken v. Bradley, 2 often appear to assume that munici-
palities have an inviolable right to local autonomy.
4. See J. DILLON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1872). Dil-
Ion's treatise was the first major treatise on American municipal law, although a previous treat-
ment of municipal law had been published in 1864. POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO MUNICIPAL
LAW (1864).
5. See infra notes 78-95 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 101-117 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 210-15 and accompanying text.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1983). See Monell v. Dep't. of Social Servs. of the City of New
York, 436 U.S. 658 (1977) (municipalities not immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Owen v.
City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1978) (municipalities have no good faith immunity from §
1983). See infra notes 222-44 and accompanying text.
9. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978) (municipali-
ties are not immune from the antitrust laws); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,
455 U.S. 40 (1982) (home rule cities not immune from the antitrust laws); see infra notes 245-68
and accompanying text.
10. San Diego Gas & Elec. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 635, 636 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (municipalities should be liable in damages for overregulation of land by zoning); see
infra notes 269-84 and accompanying text. In the Supreme Court's latest (still unsuccessful) effort
to decide the inverse condemnation issue on the merits, Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank,
Brennan states clearly his continued adherence to his position in San Diego. 105 S.Ct. 1352 (1985).
The Supreme Court recently heard oral arguments in yet a fourth case involving inverse condem-
nation, MacDonald, Summer & Frates v. County of Yolo and City of Davis, cert. granted, 88
L.Ed. 253, 186 S.Ct. 244 (1984).
II. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
12. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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Certain decisions of both the conservative majority and Justice
Brennan contradict established tenets of constitutional and municipal
law. Justice Brennan's opinions advocating an inverse condemnation
remedy for unconstitutionally restrictive zoning regulations conflict
with the principle of Supreme Court deference to regulatory legisla-
tion.13 The decisions of the conservative majority which cut back on
the scope of the fourteenth amendment in deference to local autonomy
also conflict with basic constitutional principles. Given that the four-
teenth amendment allows courts to limit state sovereignty in order to
vindicate federal constitutional rights, why should the sovereignty of
localities, which are mere subdivisions of states, limit the reach of the
fourteenth amendment when states' sovereignty cannot?
14
These critiques of Supreme Court case law may prove useful in
litigation to civil rights advocates and proponents of strong land use
controls. The Article's main goal, however, is to examine the political
and ideological forces that have produced these sharp internal contra-
dictions within the law. These forces are examined through an in-depth
analysis of the four basic formulations of city status that have emerged
since 1870: those of Thomas M. Cooley 5 and John F. Dillon 6 in the
nineteenth century, and those of Justice Brennan' 7 and the Burger
Court majority"8 today. When these formulations are placed in their
historical contexts, a pattern emerges: each author's theory of city sta-
tus is closely linked with his desire to rein in excessive governmental
power (although Cooley, Dillon, Brennan and the Burger Court major-
ity are motivated by quite different nightmares of government run
amok). 9
This Article's basic thesis concerning the constitutional vulnerabil-
ity of cities begins from the fact that cities-unlike the states or federal
government-have no set place in the American constitutional struc-
ture. 2 0 Consequently, courts and commentators have been able to rede-
fine city status without the textual constraints that limit reformulations
of the status of the state and federal governments. 2 ' The Article shows
13. See infra notes 283-84 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 216-21 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 126-27; 166-68 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 210-15 and accompanying text (Brennan); notes 78-98 and accompa-
nying text (Dillon); notes 314-29 and accompanying text (Cooley); notes 190-95 and accompany-
ing text (Burger Court majority).
20. See Herget, The Missing Power of Local Governments, 62 VA. L. REv. 999 (1976).
21. The claim that textual provisions in the Constitution constrain judges' range of
choice is, of course, a controversial one. This is not the place for an extended jurisprudential
discussion. For now, I simply quote Arthur Leff: "I do not deny that we have to muddle. I just
believe that not all muddles are identical in shape." Leff, Law and Technology: On Shoring Up a
1986:83
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that judges and commentators have responded by incorporating their
attitudes toward governmental power (inseparable from their political
beliefs) into municipal law. Thus, the history of cities' legal status is a
startlingly pure example of politics as black letter law.2 2
Doctrinal contradictions are one result. A far more important re-
sult is that crucial questions about cities-what should be the scope of
their powers, for example, or their relationship to the state-have not
been considered on their merits.2 3 This tradition should not continue in
an era when seventy percent of America's population lives in cities,24
and forty percent of all government funds are spent at a local level.25
Section I of this Article spells out Dillon's theory of city status and
the Burger Court's contradictory principle of local sovereignty, and
shows how both stem from their apprehensions about government ef-
forts to redistribute wealth.26 Section II discusses Justice Brennan's re-
cent municipal liability decisions and links them with liberals' fear of
government encroachment on individual rights.2 7 Section III links
Thomas Cooley's theory of inherent local government sovereignty with
his Jacksonian fears of special interests and activist government. 2B The
Conclusion discusses the current impact of the constitutional vulnera-
Void, 8 OTTAWA L. REV. 536, 547-48 (1976) quoted in Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the
Indeterminate Text: A Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. 821 (1985).
Carter's article begins a promising response to the formidable attack begun by legal realists and
developed by critical legal studies. See, e.g., Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional
Law: An Essay in Deconstruction, 36 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1984); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid
Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983).
22. The pattern of adjusting city status to rein in governmental abuse actually began
before 1870. See Williams, The Invention of the Municipal Corporation: A Case Study in Legal
Change, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 369, 401-04 (1985).
23. One could say such questions were considered on their merits when states adopted
home rule provisions. These provisions were originated by the Progressives and in some sense were
designed to enact Cooley's theory, see infra note 200 and text accompanying notes 35-39. They
established local control through broad and permanent delegations of state authority to localities
through constitutional provisions or statutes. See S. SATO & A. VAN ALSTYNE, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW 135-36, 147-48, 155-56 (1971). However, commentators generally agree that
courts have read home rule provisions much more narrowly than their drafters intended. See infra
note 200. For a notable recent example, see Community Communications v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40,
54-56 (1982) (Justice Brennan concludes that Colorado's home rule statute does not give Boulder
the right to regulate cable television in an opinion that gives home rule statutes a very narrow
reading). To the extent that the home rule provisions do represent a consideration on their merits
of the various issues concerning the desirable scope of city powers and their relationship to the
state, a strong claim can be made that the conclusions of this inquiry have been ignored (or, more
accurately, distorted) by judges, who have persisted in using city status as a proxy for their diverse
but intense apprehensions about excessive governmental power.
24. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL DATA BOOK AND
GUIDE TO SOURCES, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 19, 26 (1984).
25. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE AND LOCAL
ROLES IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 6 (1982) (citing figures for 1977).
26. See infra notes 40-195 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 216-84 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 289-349 and accompanying text.
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bility of cities.2 9 It also discusses Gerald Frug's influential article The
City as a Legal Concept.3" Frug's article constitutes a recent and sub-
stantial contribution to the literature on city status. Writing as part of
the critical legal studies movement, Frug linked the powerlessness of
American cities with the need of "Liberalism" to destroy all intermedi-
ate institutions between the state and the individual."1 Although Frug's
analysis is different in many respects from the other major formulations
of city status discussed in this Article, it is similar in one major way.
Frug, like Cooley, Dillon, Brennan and the Burger Court majority uses
the issue of city status as a proxy for his fears and aspirations about
governmental power.
I. LOCALITIES' LEGAL STATUS AND CONSERVATIVES' FORUM-SHIFTING
ARGUMENTS
This Section introduces the concept of political forum-shifting,
which will play a central role in this article. The term "forum-shifting"
has traditionally been used in civil procedure to refer to parties' at-
tempts to shift cases among different courts. More recently, the terms
"forum-shifting" and "forum allocation" have been used in articles
documenting Burger Court decisions that shift plaintiffs from federal to
state courts. 32 I will refer to these types of forum-shifting as "judicial
forum-shifting."
American lawyers have used a different type of forum-shifting ar-
gument in cases defining city status. Instead of shifting power among
different courts, "political forum-shifting" shifts power among differ-
ent levels of government. Three of the four formulations of city status
in American law have involved political forum-shifting arguments. In
each instance, the authors seek to shift power away from the level of
government-local, state or federal-they fear most, to a different level
29. See infra notes 350-68 and accompanying text.
30. 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980).
31. Id. at 1076-81. Frug uses the term "Liberalism" very differently from the way I use
the term "liberal." I use the term colloquially; Frug defines "Liberalism" as "our world view, one
that emerged from such theorists as Hobbes and Locke, was developed by both Bentham and
Rousseau, and was forcefully expressed in the mid-19th century in the work of John Stuart Mill."
Id. at 1074.
32. See, e.g., N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 353 (1980
supp.); Hellman, The Supreme Court, the National Law, and the Selection of Cases for the Plenary
Docket, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 521 (1983); Fisher, Institutional Competency: Some Reflections on
Judicial Activities in the Realm of Forum Allocation Between the State and the Federal Courts, 34 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 175 (1980); Nichol, Backing Into the Future: The Burger Court and the Federal
Forum, 30 U. KAN. L. REV. 341 (1980); Shaman & Turkington, The Federal Courthouse Closes
Further, 50 B.U.L. REV. 907 (1976); Zeigler, An Accommodation of the Younger Doctrine and the
Duty of Federal Courts to Enforce Constitutional Safeguards in State Criminal Process, 125 U. PA.
L. REV. 266 (1976).
1986:83
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of government they find less threatening. This section examines both
Dillon's formulation of city status and the contradictory Burger Court
local sovereignty principle, and examines how each functions as a polit-
ical forum-shifting argument. Section III shows that Cooley's theory
also functioned as a political forum-shifting argument. 3
The basic framework of municipal law was established in the sec-
ond half of the nineteenth century. Until the 1850's, American locali-
ties' legal status was highly uncertain.3 4 By 1870, two conflicting for-
mulations had emerged. Thomas M. Cooley, whose 1868 Treatise on
Constitutional Limitations3 5 was the most influential legal treatise of the
late nineteenth century,3 6 developed a theory premised on the principle
of inherent local government sovereignty. 37 According to Cooley, the
sovereign people had delegated only part of their sovereignty to the
states. They preserved the remainder for themselves in written and un-
written constitutional limitations on governmental actions.3 1 One im-
portant limitation was the people's right to local self-government.3 9
John F. Dillon offered an analysis that firmly rejected Cooley's
theory of an inherent right to local self-government. In his 1872 Trea-
tise on Municipal Corporations,4 ° Dillon asserted that cities are "crea-
33. See infra notes 285-349 and accompanying text.
34. See H. HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER 5-7 (1983); Williams, supra
note 22; Williams, Book Review, The Development of the Public/Private Distinction in American
Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 225 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Development of the Public/Private Distinc-
tion] (American cities' current legal status was not firmly established until circa 1850).
35. T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1868).
36. Paludan, Law and the Failure of Reconstruction: The Case of Thomas Cooley, 33 J.
HIST. IDEAS 597 (1972).
37. Cooley developed his theory both in his treatise, see T. COOLEY, supra note 35, at 34,
118-19, 189-90, and in Michigan Supreme Court cases decided shortly after the treatise was pub-
lished. The People ex rel. LeRoy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44 (1871), was widely heralded as the leading
case for the proposition that localities had inherent sovereignty. See Gere, Dillon's Rule and the
Cooley Doctrine, 8 J. URB. HIST. 271 (1982).
A substantial literature exists on Cooley's theory, written primarily as an off-shoot of the
Progressives' efforts to increase city powers, which led ultimately to the home rule movement. See,
e.g., Eaton, The Right to Local Self-Government (pts. I-V), 13 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1900), 13 HARV.
L. REV. 570 (1900), 13 HARV. L. REV. 638 (1900), 14 HARV. L. REV. 19 (1900), 14 HARV. L. REV.
116 (1900) (five-part series on the historical background of Cooley's theory); H. MCBAIN, MUNICI-
PAL HOME RULE (1916); F. GOODNOW, MUNICIPAL HOME RULE.(1895). For a very informative
recent treatment, see A. SYED, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 53-65 (1966). Syed
links Cooley's theory with a tradition in American political thought that goes back to Alexis de
Toqueville and Thomas Jefferson. Id. at 21-52.
38. A. SYED, supra note 37, at 54-56.
39. Cooley's theories will be discussed in greater length in Section III. See infra notes
332-49 and accompanying text.
40. J. DILLON, supra note 4. Dillon's treatise was as influential in municipal law as Coo-
ley's Constitutional Limitations was in constitutional law. It went through four editions before
1900, growing from the original one volume to five volumes.
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tures of the state,""' with only those powers given by state statutes,
which-pursuant to what came to be called "Dillon's Rule"-are
strictly construed.42 Implicit in Dillon's analysis was a constitutional
theory of cities' legal status quite different from Cooley's. In Dillon's
view, localities had no inherent sovereignty because the sovereign peo-
ple delegated their entire sovereignty to the states.4 3 Thus, municipali-
ties' authority to act was derived exclusively from their status as agents
of state government.
The crucial difference between Dillon and Cooley was Cooley's in-
sistence that the people had intended a certain core of local sovereignty
to remain inviolate.44 As courts and legislatures interpreted Dillon's
view, states' powers over cities were broad, and perhaps absolute. 45 Al-
41. Id. Dillon does not use the terminology "creature of the state" but his assertions
reflect this idea: "All corporations, public and private, exist and can exist only by virtue of express
legislative enactment, creating, or authorizing the creating, of the corporate body," id. at 52; "mu-
nicipal corporations are created by legislative act...", id. at 95. The phrase "creature of the state"
appears in the modern treatises on municipal corporation law. See, e.g., E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW
OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 143 (3rd ed. 1971).
42. J. DILLON, supra note 4 at 101-02, 103 n.I.
43. The people, of course, reserved some of their sovereignty through constitutional lim-
itations on their government. For our purposes, Dillon's crucial claim was that the people did not
delegate any part of their sovereignty to localities. This implicit constitutional analysis is never
directly stated by Dillon: like a good advocate, he treats his most basic premise as self-evident.
44. The common notion is that Dillon advocated the doctrine that the state had absolute
power over cities. Dillon did take this position in his capacity as judge as early as 1868 in City of
Clinton v. Cedar Rapids and Missouri River Railroad, 24 Iowa 455 (1868). The case involved a
railroad company authorized by the Iowa legislature to construct a two-mile connector railroad
line. The railroad laid the line out partly along a city street, with no intention of paying compensa-
tion to the city. The court, per Dillon, held for the railroad in a widely quoted declaration:
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly
from, the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot
exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. If it may destroy, it may abridge and control.
Unless there is some constitutional limitation.., the legislature might, by a single act, if
we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence
all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it.
We know of no limitation on this right so far as the corporations themselves are con-
cerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.
Id. at 475.
This analysis was far from settled in contemporary case law, see Williams, City Powerless-
ness (Jan. 31, 1984) (unpublished paper given to joint meeting of Columbia University City Semi-
nar and The Society for the Study of Early American Culture [hereinafter cited as City Powerless-
ness]). Dillon himself backed away from this absolutist position two years later in his treatise,
noting "the adjudged cases present some contrariety of opinion respecting the scope of legislative
authority over municipal corporations." J. DILLON, supra note 4, at 75.
45. See E. GRIFFITH & C. ADRIAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT: THE
FORMATION OF TRADITIONS, 1775-1870, 53 (1983) [hereinafter cited as FOIMATION OF TRADITIONS].
The more common situation was when a legislature took over only a limited number of
basic city functions, usually because the legislature was Republican and the city was controlled by
Democrats. Control over patronage was also very often an issue, as it was in the situation that
resulted in the famous early case of People ex. rel. Fernando Wood v. Draper, 15 N.Y. 532 (1857).
The events leading up to Draper were typical: the Republican legislature abolished local police
organizations in New York City and replaced them with a Metropolitan Police District controlled
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though Cooley's theory provided potential limits on states' power over
cities, it had been firmly rejected by American courts by 1900.46 Dil-
Ion's theory became accepted wisdom.4 7
Cooley's theory is discussed in Section III. The remainder of this
Section analyzes why conservatives a century apart-Dillon and the
Burger Court majority-generated contradictory formulations of city
status. The discussion will show that both formulations are by-products
of political forum-shifting arguments designed to set sharp limits on
governmental power. Dillon's principle that cities are mere creatures of
the states will be analyzed first. The discussion then turns to the Burger
Court's local sovereignty principle.
A. John Forrest Dillon: "BE BRAVE, LOYAL AND SUCCESSFUL!",
4 1
John F. Dillon has often been interpreted as an academic ally of
the robber barons in the Gilded Age.49 This interpretation of Dillon is
close to the mark. Yet legal scholars, in interpreting Dillon basically as
a treatise writer,5" have overlooked the significance of the fact that Dil-
lon was one of the early corporate lawyers. 5 Dillon's career, examined
in this light, takes on a new coherence. Throughout his life, Dillon
sought to identify himself with the ruling elite by providing both exper-
tise and a legal ideology that served its interests. This Section shows
that Dillon's theory of city status and his "public purpose" doctrine are
best analyzed as examples of laissez-faire constitutionalism,52 the legal
ideology he helped create. Moreover, it shows that both these doctrines
and the ideology behind them stemmed from Dillon's desire to limit the
frenzied issuance of bonds by municipalities in the post-Civil War era.
by the Republican governor and senate. Draper was a rare case where the courts struck down the
"ripper" legislation, see Id. at 52-56; J. ADAMS, DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY 487 (1940); F.
GOODNOW, supra note 37, at 21-27; E. GRIFFITH, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT, THE
CONSPICUOUS FAILURE, 1870-1900 212-13 (1974). See also infra note 348.
46. FORMATION OF TRADITIONS, supra note 45, at 39-41; H. MCBAIN, supra note 37, at
12-17.
47. Dillon's theory remains accepted wisdom today, not only in municipal law, see E.
MCQUILLIN, supra note 41, at 8, but in American law in general. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341, 351 (1963) (referring to a dual system of government, i.e., only the federal and state govern-
ments have inherent sovereignty).
48. J. DILLON, LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA 389 (1895).
49. See C. JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS (1954); A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRI-
SIS AND THE RULE OF LAW 12-13, 142-43 (1969); S. FINE, LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL WEL-
FARE STATE 126-64 (1956). All are works in the Progressive tradition. For a modern version of a
similar argument, see H. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION (1973).
50. See, e.g., C. JACOBS, supra note 49, at 111-27; H. HYMAN, supra note 49, at 376-77,
516-17.
51. See J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAWMAKERS 295-313 (1950)
(general account of changing character of law practice in the late 19th century); G. GAWALT, THE
NEW HIGH PRIESTS 3-74 (1985) (specific reference to Dillon).
52. See infra notes 74-94 and accompanying text.
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Dillon was admitted to the bar in 1852 at the age of twenty-one
and was elected town prosecutor the same year. From then on his ca-
reer never faltered. A life-long Republican, he was elected to the local
court at the age of twenty-seven, and to the Iowa Supreme Court soon
thereafter. While on the Iowa court he gained national stature; Presi-
dent Grant appointed him to the Eighth Circuit in 1869." 3
In 1879, in a move that bespeaks his ultimate ambition, Dillon left
Iowa for New York City. 4 Ostensibly he went to New York to accept
an appointment to the faculty of Columbia Law School. Before Dillon
left Iowa, however, he had been appointed General Solicitor of the
Union Central Railroad Company, one of the largest railroads in the
country. 55 He retained Union Pacific as a client while teaching at Co-
lumbia, and rapidly added others. Within three years, "the calls for his
services as a lawyer were so important that he concluded to devote his
entire time to the practice of law," in the words of one contemporary
chronicler.5 6 His clients eventually included Western Union, four ma-
53. Sources consulted for information on Dillon's life include: I NATIONAL CYCLOPAE-
DIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 268-69 (1891) (entry on Dillon) [hereinafter cited as NAT. CYCLO.];
Stiles, Judge John F. Dillon, 9 ANNALS OF IOWA, A HISTORICAL QUARTERLY (1909); Stiles, Judge
Dillon's Law Publications, 5 ANNALS OF IOWA, A HISTORICAL QUARTERLY 634-35 (1903); Clay,
John Forrest Dillon, 23 THE GREEN BAG 447-50 (1911) [hereinafter cited as GREEN BAG]; Stiles,
John F. Dillon, in RECOLLECTIONS AND SKETCHES OF NOTABLE LAWYERS AND PUBLIC MEN OF
EARLY IOWA 183-210 (1916) [hereinafter cited as RECOLLECTIONS AND SKETCHES]; Hubbard, John
F. Dillon: Fourteenth President of Association, 14 A.B.A.J. 77, 77-79 (1928).
Evidence of Dillon's ambition abounds. The story of how he became a lawyer is a good
example. By the age of 19 he was a rising young doctor and the secretary of a local medical society.
[I]f it had not been for two seemingly minor facts Doctor Dillon might have continued to
practice medicine all his life and the bench and bar might have never known his judicial
and law work. There were then not only few railroads, but few good wagon roads. So a
doctor, to attend his patients, must needs ride horseback over muddy or sandy roads
unfit for carriages. By some accident Dillon had a slight hernia which made it unsafe or
unwise for him to ride horseback. Nothing daunted by this slight misfortune (which he
often mentioned among his intimate friends as the reason for giving up the practice of
medicine) Doctor Dillon resolved to study law.
RECOLLECTIONS AND SKETCHES supra, at 77. Dillon, who supported himself during this period by
running a drug store, described his legal education in 1907.
mhe next evening when young lawyer Howe and myself were taking our regular walk up
and down the banks of the Des Moines river I turned to him and said, "Howe, I have
made a great mistake. I cannot practice medicine in this country without being able to
ride on horseback which I am utterly unable to do. I might as well admit the mistake and
turn my mind to something else. I shall read law. Tell me, what is the first book that a
student of the law requires?" He answered "Blackstone's Commentaries. Have you got
them?" He replied, "Yes, I have them and the Iowa Blue book of laws and those are the
only books I have." He was kind enough to loan me his Blackstone and I began at once
to read law in my little dilapidated office.
Id. at 188.
54. New York City was the undisputed center of corporate practice during this period.
See Hobson, Symbol of the New Profession: Emergence of the Large Law Firm 1870-1915, in G.
GAWALT, supra note 51, at 10.
55. 1 NAT. CYCLO., supra note 53, at 268.
56. Hubbard, supra note 53, at 78.
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jor railroad corporations, and the famous robber baron and financier,
Jay Gould.57
Dillon designed his career to join the corporate elite, not by be-
coming an industrialist himself, but by making himself indispensable to
those who were.5" His generation invented the corporate lawyer.
Before the Civil War, most lawyers for large corporations were com-
pany employees. Dillon carefully maintained his independence from his
clients and, as a contemporary noted with some surprise, "in spite of his
wealthy corporation practice, his services were never to be had in aid of
sharp or questionable practices." 59 Although he allied himself with the
ruling elite, he viewed his role as one of consolidating their power by
making them respectable, or, as he would no doubt have put it, holding
them to high standards.6 °
Dillon's interest in municipal corporations, while it strikes a mod-
ern audience as incongruous with his ultimate ambitions, was a logical
step along his chosen path. Municipal corporations were important
during Dillon's lifetime because municipal bonding was to nineteenth
century corporate lawyers what mergers and acquisitions work is to
corporate lawyers today. During the nineteenth century, a major focus
of capitalists' efforts was to provide America with a modern transporta-
tion system. Between 1820 and 1880, a transportation revolution was
accomplished, as entrepreneurs built first canals and then railroads. 6'
After the Civil War, building proceeded with spectacular speed, partic-
57. "[Dillon's] practice was lucrative, he was a shrewd businessman, and left a substan-
tial estate." Id. at 79.
58. Like many modem corporate lawyers, Dillon could assess the business as well as the
legal merits of his clients' business dealings. See infra note 291.
59. Hubbard, supra note 53, at 79:
No man could come to Judge Dillon to get him to do things contrary to the right. Men
consulted him to learn the truth of the matter and the law, and never to persuade him to
try to do crooked things for them ... He never, so far as I knew, speculated to make
money, not even if, as a lawyer, he knew facts which might have been useful in a
speculation.
One senses again an aura of surprise that a lawyer so closely associated with the fast financial
circles of Jay Gould should be so personally upright.
60. Evidently corporate law has been a high-intensity occupation from the beginning.
According to one contemporary chronicler:
It is said that during [Dillon's] early career on the bench he devoted so much time at
home to his legal work that his wife felt he did not give enough attention to social affairs,
and she said to him one day, "Why do you work so hard? Don't you think you ought to
give more time to your family and friends?" The Judge's reply was that he had a reputa-
tion to make. And years afterwards when he had achieved fame as a great judge, author
and lawyer engaged in general practice his answer to the same question was, "I have a
reputation to keep."
Clay, supra note 53, at 448.
61. See G. TAYLOR, THE TRANSPORTATION REVOLUTION 1815-1860 (1951); M. MEYERS,
THE JACKSONIAN PERSUASION 88-90 (1957).
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ularly in the West. In 1865, there were only 3,272 miles of track west of
the Mississippi; by 1890, that mileage had risen to 72,473.62
This explosive rate of building required huge amounts of capital.
Consequently, much of the financial structure of the country became
inextricably tied to railroad bonds. From the beginning, railroads had
received financial help from the public sector.63 After the Civil War, a
typical scenario emerged: an entrepreneur would come into a tiny ham-
let with a proposal to construct a railroad. He would tell residents that a
railroad connection would make their town into a boomtown-the next
Cincinnati, or even Chicago-so that their farmland would become
prime urban real estate.64 To attain the wealth of Midas, all the town
had to do was to issue bonds to help finance the railroad. Many towns
did and the debt of municipalities rose exponentially during the course
of the century.65
Many of the railroads financed by municipal bonds were in a pre-
carious financial position, because their financial stability was predi-
cated on increases in population that did not occur. By the 1860's, it
was obvious that bonding by municipalities would soon become the
focus of a major economic and legal maelstrom. Moreover, Iowa was at
the eye of the storm. In 1853, the Supreme Court of Iowa had followed
near-universal precedent in upholding towns' ability to issue bonds in
aid of railroads.66 Then, in 1862, the court reversed itself and held that
the state constitution prohibited municipal bonding. A number of cit-
ies, including Dubuque, repudiated bonds previously issued.67 Al-
though the United States Supreme Court eventually held Dubuque lia-
62. D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS-THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE 120-21 (1973).
63. O.& M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH; Pinsky, State Constitutional Limitations on
Public Industrial Financing: An Historical and Economic Approach, Ill U. PA. L. REv. 277-78
(1963).
64. D. BOORSTIN, supra note 62, at 120-31.
65. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, CENSUS OFFICE, REPORT ON VALUATION TAXATION AND
PUBLIC INDEBTEDNESS IN THE UNITED STATES 672-99 (1844) (detailing public debt of cities, towns,
and municipalities incurred for the purpose of financing railroad construction). The exponential
increase in municipal railroad aid is evidenced by sharp rise in public debt between 1838 and 1880.
For instance, by 1844 towns, cities, and municipalities in Ohio had expended $18,408,000, an
increase of over 13 million dollars from the 1838 level. Id. at 526, 695. See also G. TAYLOR, supra
note 61, at 92-93 (1951) (discussing state and local aid to railroads); Heath, Public Railroad Con-
struction and Development of Private Enterprise in the South Before 1861, in 10 TASKS OF ECONOMIC
HISTORY 43, 52 (1950) (stating that southern states funded over half of railroads, capitalization
costs).
66. Dubuque Co. v. Dubuque & Pacific R.R. Co., 4 Greene (Iowa, 1853) (Iowa case of
first impression holding that country can issue bonds in aid of railroads). Note also the dissenting
opinion, per Judge Kinney, stating arguments later adopted by the majority in granting an injunc-
tion against issuance of railroad bonds.
67. See C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT-RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION
935 (1971).
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ble for repayment of its debt,6" the Iowa bond repudiation sent shock
waves through the American business and financial community, which
feared widespread repudiation of municipal debt and disruption of na-
tional credit markets.69 Dillon began his Treatise on Municipal Corpo-
rations shortly after the Iowa bond repudiation crisis began." ° The trea-
tise's preface suggests a direct link between municipal bonding and his
interest in localities. Dillon wrote: "it has, unfortunately, become quite
too common with us to confer upon our [municipal] corporations ex-
traordinary powers, such as the authority to aid in the construction of
railways, or other undertakings, which are better left to private
capital .. ."71
According to one knowledgeable observer "Judge Dillon knew
everything about municipal bonds." 7 2 Dillon's analysis of the bonding
crisis, and the solutions he advocated, were typically far-reaching. The
United States Supreme Court, as concerned as Dillon about repudia-
tions, became, in the words of one dissenting justice, "monomaniacs...
bigots and fanatics' 7 3 on the subject of bond repudiations. While the
Supreme Court fixated on holding municipalities to every worthless is-
sue, Dillon took a different approach. Dillon formulated two major
doctrines designed to limit the power of municipalities. One, the public
purpose doctrine, eliminated altogether the ability of towns to issue
bonds for railroads or other "private" purposes. The second was even
more far-reaching. Dillon's Rule, by making cities subservient to the
state, sharply limited city power to undertake not only bonding, but
any activity. Both doctrines functioned in a way characteristic of the
ideology of which they were a part. In a sense, Dillon's ultimate solu-
tion to the bonding crisis was to participate in the creation of a new
legal ideology that sharply limited governmental power over the
economy.
68. Id. at 935-40. Fairman criticizes the Supreme Court's decision in the landmark case
of Gelpcke v. Dubuque, I Wall. 175 (1864), in which the Supreme Court overruled a state supreme
court's interpretation of its state constitution.
69. See H. HYMAN, supra note 49, at 272-33, 376-77.
70. The crisis began in 1862, with State of Iowa ex rel. Burlington & Missouri R.R. v.
County of Wapello, 13 Iowa 388 (1862) (holding that the Iowa constitution precluded issuance of
bonds). Dillon's treatise took him six years to complete and was first published in 1872. See Stiles,
supra note 53, at 118.
71. J. DILLON, supra note 4, at 102 quoted in H. HYMAN, supra note 49, at 376.
72. C. FAIRMAN, supra note 67, at 923. Fairman stresses that Dillon knew the financial as
well as the legal aspect of bonding. Contemporary commentary suggests that Dillon was regarded
as an absolute authority both on municipal law and on bonds. See Stiles, supra note 53, at 116-18.
Dillon also wrote a book on municipal bonds: J. DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL BONDS (1876).
73. C. FAIRMAN, supra note 67, at 920 (quoting Justice Samuel Miller).
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An early and influential articulation of the premises of this ideol-
ogy occurred in Hanson v. Vernon,74 an extremely influential bonding
opinion Dillon wrote while he was Chief Justice of the Iowa Supreme
Court. Hanson was the opinion in which Dillon broke sharply with es-
tablished precedent and struck down an Iowa statute authorizing rail-
road bonds on the grounds that bonds could not be issued, nor any
taxes raised, for "private" purposes. Prior practice left the decision con-
cerning which purposes were public and which were private to the legis-
lature; Dillon placed that decision clearly with the courts. 75
Dillon's opinion in Hanson was soon overruled,76 yet it is worth
examining in detail both because the "public purpose" doctrine ulti-
mately predominated in American law,7 7 and because Dillon set forth
in Hanson the framework of laissez-faire jurisprudence which most
American lawyers know as the constitutionalism of the Lochner
Court.78
Dillon began his opinion in Hanson by explaining to disappointed
railroadmen that his decision served their long-term interests:
Our decision ... will no doubt disappoint many other per-
sons. I could have wished it otherwise; and I certainly ap-
proached the ... question (of the bonds' validity) with a dis-
position ... to sustain the act ... if it could be done without a
dangerous breach in those barriers which the constitution has
erected to protect private property from legislative
invasion. 79
Thus, Dillon characterized the bonding controversy as one involv-
ing a clash between private property and government power. This for-
74. 27 Iowa 28 (1869). Note that State v. Wapello, 13 Iowa 388 (1862), was based on the
Iowa constitution, whereas Hanson was based on general constitutional principles. The two cases
differed in terms of substance as well. The Wapello court held that bonds already issued were
invalid; Hanson held that no new bonds could be issued. See infra notes 317-23 and accompanying
text.
75. Dillon's argument came from Cooley's Treatise on Constitutional Limitations, which
had been published the year before. See CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS supra note 35, at 490.
76. The Iowa legislature had reenacted the statutes struck down in Hanson v. Vernon as
soon as it became apparent that Judge Dillon was going to leave the Iowa Supreme Court to take
up his appointment to the Eighth Circuit. The reconstituted Iowa Court sustained the statutes to
Dillon's "evident disgust." C. FAIRMAN, supra note 67, at 979, 989-90.
77. See E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 41, at 626. The Supreme Court in Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984), traveled a substantial distance towards reinstituting the
practice of letting the legislature decide what is a public purpose. The actual issue in Midkiffwas
not the requirement that taxes be for a public purpose but the principle that land taken by eminent
domain must be for a public use. However, Justice O'Connor's opinion appears to confuse the two
so irretrievably that her approach to "public use" doctrine is also applicable in "public purpose"
contexts.
78. See infra note 82.
79. 27 Iowa 28, 34-35 (1869).
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mulation would have seemed foreign to many of his contemporaries.
Dillon, by focusing the issue around the central metaphor of a clash
between government and property, introduced the central framework
of laissez-faire constitutionalism. "Is the power of the legislature so
transcendent," he asked, "and is its arm so strong, that it may put it
forth and grasp every man's property?"" ° Dillon responded with what
was at the time an extremely innovative doctrinal argument, that the
due process clause limited the legislature's ability to "impose the tax"
(i.e., authorize the bond issue).8" Use of the fourteenth amendment to
protect property, rather than civil rights, is of course a hallmark of the
constitutionalism of the Lochner Court.82 Dillon's transmutation of the
bonding question into a due process issue was an early instance in
which a state law was invalidated on due process grounds because it
violated property rights. Dillon continued:
Of what value, indeed, would be the boasted American idea of
securing private rights, and the rights of a minority (for it usu-
ally is the minority and not the majority that needs protec-
tion) by constitutional limitations on the power of the legisla-
ture, i.e. on the power of the majority, if no tribunal existed to
decide when the legislature disregarded these limitations?
83
This statement begins to fill in the players in Dillon's jurisprudential
universe, and shows how he links the transcendent importance of pri-
vate property with the need for activist judicial review. When the ma-
80. Id. at 40. For an explicit defense of private property by Dillon, see J. DILLON, PROP-
ERTY: ITS RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN OUR LEGAL AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS (1897) [hereinafter cited as PRI-
VATE PROPERTY]:
Until lately the conviction among all our people has been general and unquestioned, that
these great primordial rights, including the right of private property, whether gained by
one's own toil or acquired by inheritance or will, were protected and made firm and
secure by our republican system of government. Such is the established social order. But
in our own day, the utility as well as the rightfulness of these fundamental principles are
drawn in question by combined attacks upon them and upon the social fabric that has
been built upon them. This assault upon society, as now organized, is made by bodies of
men who call themselves, and are variously called, communists, socialists, anarchists, or
by like designations.
Id. at 8.
81. 27 Iowa 28, 45 (1869). Dillon miscited Cooley's Constitutional Limitations for this
analysis. In fact, Cooley's treatise did not adopt the position Dillon was defending. See CONSTITU-
TIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 35, at 356-59. This is the kind of miscite that led to historians'
conclusion that Cooley's jurisprudence was laissez-faire constitutionalism of the type identified
with the Lochner Court. See infra note 292.
82. For a description of Lochner era jurisprudence, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 434-55 (1978). Like Tribe, I use the term "Lochner" to refer both to the Court that
actually decided the Lochner case, and to subsequent courts that accepted the Lochner Court's
substantive due process analysis. Thus, it describes the Supreme Court's constitutional jurispru-
dence from the turn of the twentieth century until the mid-1930's.
83. Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa 28, 42 (1869).
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jority, through the legislature, threatened private property, the judici-
ary had the duty to enforce constitutional guarantees designed to
protect the minority's constitutional rights, notably property, "since
few interests take a deeper hold on man than those which relate to
property.",
8 4
Dillon's reverence for private property is hardly surprising in a
man who so clearly designed his life to join the corporate elite by serv-
ing as its spokesman and attorney. But Dillon retained a degree of intel-
lectual independence.8 5 After all, as he acknowledged, many
railroadmen in need of funds must have been sharply disappointed by
Hanson and relieved when it was overruled. Dillon's formulation of the
bonding issue shows that he served not a social class but a social vision.
This vision ultimately benefited the elite far more than would mere syc-
ophantism, for it allowed the elite to argue that its self-interest served
broad social goals.
The laissez-faire premises underlying Dillon's vision were quite ex-
plicit. In Hanson he responded to the railroad's arguments that his deci-
sion would retard growth with naturalistic imagery common in contem-
porary economics.8 6 He expressed his "skepticism in the
unhealthfulness of an artificial growth caused by the unnatural stimulus
of public taxation in favor of private enterprises. ... More promis-
ing in the long run than the "unnatural stimulus" of public taxation
was the natural functioning of the market system. But in order for the
market to work, private property had to be secure, and property would
never be secure unless a sharp and rigid line was drawn between the
public and private spheres. The courts' duty to guard private property
rights, originally explained by the Federalists on the grounds that prop-
erty was a natural right,88 for Dillon stemmed from the requirements of
laissez-faire economics.
Traditional commentators have focused on the links between lais-
sez-faire jurisprudence and contemporary political and economic con-
ditions. Recent revisionists, notably Duncan Kennedy, have focused on
84. Id. at 42-43.
85. For another interpretation of early corporate lawyers as producers of ideology, see
Gordon, Lawyers and Legal Thought in the Age of Enterprise, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL
IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70-73, 87-97 (G. Geison ed. 1983) and Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual
in the Law": Fantasies and Practices of New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in G. GAWALT, supra
note 51, at 61-62.
86. C. HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 52-55 (1930); B. WRIGHT, JR.,
AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW 64-94 (1931).
87. 27 Iowa 28, 59 (1869).
88. For a fascinating brief discussion of the way American political rhetoric has been
adopted by successive generations to accomplish divergent policy goals, see E. WHITE, THE AMERI-
CAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 367-75 (1976).
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how laissez-faire jurisprudence functioned as an ideology.8 9 The study
of jurisprudence as ideology entails an analysis of how a particular ju-
risprudence creates a coherent rhetorical universe that functions to
make its creators' social vision seem the most (or only) logical answer to
the question of how society should function.
Hanson reflects a fairly well developed version of laissez-faire con-
stitutionalism, which Kennedy has called classical legal thought. Ken-
nedy shows how this jurisprudence transmuted policy choices, properly
left to the legislature, into "objective" legal determinations properly left
to judges (many of whom, like Dillon, identified with the corporate
elite).
The premise of Classicism was that the legal system consisted
of a set of institutions, each of which had the traits of a legal
actor. Each institution had been delegated by the sovereign
people a power to carry out its will, which was absolute within
but void outside its sphere. The justification of this judicial
role was the existence of a peculiar legal technique rendering
the task of policing the boundaries of spheres an objective,
quasi-scientific one.9"
Dillon's public purpose doctrine shows how the notion that pow-
ers are absolute within their spheres served to translate a policy choice
into an "objective," quasi-scientific holding. Before the public purpose
doctrine, the issue of whether towns should issue railroad bonds was
hotly contested in the political arena. 9 The issue was a political one
because the legislatures' judgments concerning whether the purpose of
a bond or tax was suitably "public" were considered final. In part be-
cause "public" and "private" were not yet viewed as dichotomous, mu-
tually exclusive spheres, the line between public and private was viewed
as open to political debate and negotiation.92 In this context, for a
judge to invalidate a bond issue on the grounds that the current system
threatened capital markets would have seemed outrageously "politi-
cal." In sharp contrast, it seemed entirely proper within the context of
Dillon's jurisprudence for a judge to invalidate bonds that violated the
public purpose doctrine, because the line between public and private
came to be viewed as an objective, quasi-scientific one. Moreover, ac-
89. Kennedy, Towards An Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of
Classical Legal Thought in America 1850-1940, 3 REs. IN LAW & Soc. 3. See also McCurdy, Justice
Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez Faire
Jurisprudence, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970-1005 (1975).
90. Kennedy, supra note 89, at 7.
91. See generally C. FAIRMAN, supra note 67, at 918-1116.
92. See Development of the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 34, at 230-34.
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cording to classical jurisprudence, one of the judiciary's major roles was
to enforce a sharp separation between the public and private spheres.
Dillon's formulation of city status is equally characteristic of class-
ical legal thought. Although Dillon claimed that he was only transmit-
ting an ancient common law tradition when he crystallized his view of
city status,93 he in fact played an active role in establishing city
powerlessness as the norm.9 4 Dillon's formulation of city status func-
tioned rhetorically in a way similar to the public purpose doctrine. Both
doctrines set up two dichotomous categories. If the government action
was for a "public purpose" or was "authorized by the state," it was
valid. If the challenged action was for a private purpose or was not
authorized by the state, it was invalid. Courts performed the technical
task of determining to which mutually exclusive category the contested
action belonged.
Both doctrines served to translate a policy question about which
there was little consensus-the proper scope of city power-from the
realm of the legislature into a technical legal judgment suitable for a
judge. For example, Dillon's public purpose doctrine translated the
question of what were proper projects for a town to finance through
taxation into an "objective"determination of whether a given tax had a
legally valid "public purpose." Similarly, Dillon's Rule and its accom-
panying doctrines turned the political question of whether a city ought
to be able to engage to a given activity-to wipe out cholera, for exam-
ple, or to build public housing-into a technical question of whether
each action had been authorized by state law.
Dillon's formulation of city status, unlike the public purpose test,
was a political forum-shifting doctrine. Whereas under the public pur-
pose test an action not authorized by the state (i.e. a tax enacted for a
"private" purpose) fell outside the competency of government alto-
gether, under Dillon's Rule the power to undertake a contested action
was merely transferred from one level of government (the municipality)
to a different one (the state). Dillon's Rule accomplished its purpose
because it shifted power away from the level of government Dillon most
feared: municipalities.9 5 Dillon's continuing apprehension about mu-
nicipalities shows that the crisis over bonding played a central role in
his imagination.96
Yet, the importance of local governments in the late nineteenth
century went beyond their role in financing railroads. In the decades
93. J. DILLON, supra note 4, at 51, 57-58.
94. See City Powerlessness, supra note 44, at 41.
95. See H. HYMAN, supra note 49, at 377 ("With Dillon's text as guide, state after state
increased constitutional and derivative statutory clauses designed to limit cities' functions, debt
ceilings, voting-residence details, and tax structures."); see also Gere, supra note 37, at 278.
96. See supra notes 66-83 and accompanying text.
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after 1850, localities were in many ways the major governmental pres-
ence in Americans' lives. Localities spent more money than the state
and federal governments combined.9 7 No level of government yet en-
gaged in extensive regulation, but with the dramatic growth in city pop-
ulation, pressure increased for governmental protection of public
health and welfare. This led to proposals to provide adequate sanita-
tion and other services as well as pressure to regulate business practices.
Most governmental services were provided at the local level, and during
this era such services potentially included construction of the basic in-
frastructure of the modern metropolis: water and sewer systems, public
transportation and city parks.9" The importance of government at the
local level and the increased demand for municipal services may well
have reinforced Dillon's conviction that the primary threat of excessive
governmental power was presented by municipalities.
Dillon's formulation of city status was typical of later forum-shift-
ing arguments. 99 It functioned to transfer decisionmaking authority
away from the level of government Dillon feared most. The power was
transferred to judges who could strike down city actions, and to states,
from whom Dillon had less fear of governmental abuse. As the remain-
der of this Article will show, Dillon's was only one of a series of formu-
lations in which the legal status of cities was a by-product of their au-
thors' fear of governmental power.
B. The Burger Court Majority
"(R)ights in property are basic civil rights ... no less than the
right to speak or the right to travel." 1 '
97. Local government spent 56% of all government expenditures in 1902; states spent
8% and the federal government spent 36%. H. KAUFMAN, POLITICS AND POLICIES IN STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 21 (1963). (Note that some scholars have pointed out that the federal gov-
ernment implemented a broad variety of policy objectives in the 19th century through financing
mechanisms, such as land grants, that did not entail direct government expenditures. See, e.g., D.
ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP 238, 312-17 (1962)).
Current percentages are as follows: the federal government spends 70%, states spend 18%,
localities spend 12%. (All figures are calculated before intergovernmental transfers) ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF FISCAL FEDERALISM -
1982-83 (1984) (1982 figures cited).
Localities' debt also was substantially larger in 1902 than the debt of the states and the
federal governments combined: localities' debt was $1.877 billion; states' debt was $230 million;
the federal government's debt was $1.178 billion. H. KAUFMAN, supra at 22.
98. See H. HYMAN, supra note 49, at 226-66 (Hyman documents the pressure for in-
creased government activism to solve new urban problems after the Civil War); FORMATION OF
TRADITIONS, supra note 45, at 65-106.
99. See infra notes 169-86, 343-49 and accompanying text.
100. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 552 (1972).
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1. PARALLELS BETWEEN LATE 19TH AND LATE 20TH CENTURY
CONSERVATIVES' SOCIAL VISION
Dillon was quite open about his feeling that the primary threat of
excessive governmental power was the threat to private property. In
sharp contrast, one searches in vain for explicit articulations of the so-
cial vision of the conservative Burger Court majority. This notable si-
lence must be interpreted within the context of the Court's rhetorical
universe, which cannot be fully understood without reference to the
Warren Court.
It is an accepted tenet of the American legal establishment that the
Warren Court engaged in judicial activism to achieve social goals."t '
The Burger Court, and Justice Rehnquist in particular, has reacted
against the Warren Court by claiming that the Court should return to
strict construction and abandon the dangerous practice of reading its
own political philosophy into the Constitution.' 02 Thus the absence of
explicit statements of political tenets in Burger Court opinions is hardly
surprising. To extract the Court's philosophy one must unearth the val-
ues implicit in its decisions. A close reading of the cases shows striking
parallels between what Dillon and the Rehnquist majority identify as
the principal danger posed by excessive governmental power.
t0 3
101. For scholarly statements, see B. SCHWARTZ & L. LESHER, INSIDE THE WARREN COURT
(1983) (calling the Warren Court "a midwife to change" and referring to Burger Court activism as
a "retreat"); B. SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF (1983); J. POLLACK, EARL WARREN - THE JUDGE WHO
CHANGED AMERICA (1979) (comparing Warren to John Marshall); W.T. MITAU, DECADE OF DECI-
SION - THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 1954-64 (1967):
102. For an explicit statement of this philosophy see Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living
Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REv. 693 (1976).
103. The claim that, despite Rehnquist's protests to the contrary, Burger Court decisions
are informed by the justices' political vision, stems ultimately from tenets of legal realism widely
accepted among American lawyers. For examples of cases where the conservative Burger Court
majority has supported the federal government despite its ideology of opposition to federal power,
see Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (government can revoke passport of citizen who threatens to
reveal names of CIA agents); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (government can enjoin
ex-CIA agent from publishing memoirs).
Current law review articles challenging Rehnquist's claims to be apolitical tend often to
mobilize new conceptual technologies to provide added dimensions to this basic realist analysis.
See, e.g., Denvir, Justice Rehnquist and Constitutional Interpretation, 34 HAST. L. Rav. 1011 (her-
meneutics). For a recent, highly sophisticated version of the realist approach, see Sherry, Issue
Manipulation by the Burger Court: Saving the Community from Itself, 70 MINN. L. REv. 611 (1986).
See also Kleven, The Constitutional Philosophy of Justice William H. Rehnquist, 8 VT. L. REV. 1
(1983) (provides a close reading of Rehnquist's cases and concludes his approach is not consis-
tently that of a "strict constructionist"). The traditional legal realist analysis is now most common
in non-legal periodicals, see Fiss & Krauthammer, The Rehnquist Court, THE NEW REPUBLIC
(Mar. 10, 1982); Rehnquist's and GOP Platform's Voices in Close Harmony, The Washington Post,
Sept. 2, 1980, at A-2, col. 1.
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Many commentators have noted Rehnquist's and the Burger
Court majority's solicitude for private property.'0 4 One identified the
central principle of contemporary Supreme Court jurisprudence to be
"the recrudescence of libertarian thought that identifies liberty with pri-
vate property."' Others have drawn direct links between the Burger
Court and the Supreme Court in the Lochner era. 10 6 Cases cited include
those that breathe new life into the contract clause, takings cases, and
cases in which first amendment rights are limited in favor of property
rights or their exercise is linked to control of economic assets. 10 7 Less
often noted, but equally significant, are cases in which the Court has
upheld property qualifications in elections for a broad range of local
government units. 10
Commentators also provide substantial evidence of the Burger
Court's adherence to a philosophy of laissez-faire. Although the term
laissez-faire is used primarily as an epithet today,'o 9 the Burger Court's
reluctance to make decisions that impede "efficiency" is readily trans-
latable into laissez-faire terminology. Just as Dillon opposed remnants
of mercantilism (such as railroad aid) because he feared impediments to
the natural and desirable functioning of the market, many Burger
Court cases are guided by a neoclassical "competition efficiency" para-
104. Oakes, "Property Rights" in Constitutional Analysis Today, 56 WASH. L. REV. 583,
596-97 (1981) (Court again giving property rights substantive constitutional content); Van Al-
styne, The Recrudescence of Property Rights as the Foremost Principle of Civil Liberties: The First
Decade of the Burger Supreme Court, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 66, 70 (1980) (reemergence of
property rights in 1970's decisions); Dorsen & Gora, The Burger Court and Freedom of Speech, in
V. BLASI, THE BURGER COURT 30-41 (1983); Fiss & Krauthammer, supra note 103, at 21
(Rehnquist uses state autonomy arguments to promote property rights); Lind, Justice Rehnquist:
First Amendment Speech in the Labor Context, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 120 (1980); Nowak,
Resurrecting Realist Jurisprudence: The Political Bias of Burger Court Justices, 17 SUFFOLK. U.L.
REV. 550, 579-80 (1983) ("libertarian" Burger Court prefers property rights over Bill of Rights);
Comment, Property Versus Civil Rights: An Alternative to the Double Standard, 11/51 N. Ky. L.
REV., 85-93 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Alternative to the Double Standard].
105. Van Alstyne, supra note 104, at 66.
106. Id. at 73. See also Oakes, supra note 104, at 599-601,615-16, 622; Nowak, supra note
104, at 599-616 (extended comparison of Burger Court with Lochner Court).
107. See Nowak, supra note 104, at 579-80 ("libertarian" Burger Court has found that the
Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment do not justify judicial limitation of property rights);
Dorsen & Gora, supra note 104, at 31 ("with few exceptions, the key to whether free speech will
receive protection depends on an underlying property interest..."); Van Alstyne, supra note 104,
at 72-79 (linkage of free speech with private property); Alternative to the Double Standard, supra
note 104, at 93 (takings clause; first amendment). See also Denvir, supra note 103, at 1026-27
(takings and contract clause cases).
108. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973)
(upholding property qualifications for election of officers of sparsely populated water district); Ball
v. James, 451 U.S. 375 (198 1) (upholding property qualifications for election of officers of huge,
multi-purpose special district encompassing major urban populations). Property qualifications for
elections involving general-purpose governments, advocated by the Federalists, disappeared dur-
ing the Jacksonian era. R. VAN DEUSEN, THE JACKSONIAN ERA 10-11 (1959).
109. See, e.g., Fiss & Krauthammer, supra note 103, at 21.
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digm which stresses the need to exclude political and social policy con-
siderations so the market can function at maximum efficiency. 1 0
The Burger Court's emphasis on efficiency has much in common
with laissez-faire theory. Dillon believed that the greatest threat of ex-
cessive governmental power was to property rights, and that govern-
mental intrusion on property rights would be disastrous because it
would severely threaten the market's natural functioning."' The con-
servative Burger Court majority has a similar solicitude for property
rights because of a similar belief that the best approach to overall social
welfare is to allow efficient operation of the market, which can only
occur if property rights are secure."2
This analysis of the parallels between the Burger Court and Dillon,
though by no means wrong, is oversimplified."1 3 It is important to re-
member that Dillon and the Burger Court operate within very different
sets of givens; for example, Dillon fervently opposed the income tax. 14
The lack of direct analogy extends beyond specific issues. A more accu-
rate analysis would note the similarities between basic concerns without
forcing Dillon and the Burger Court into an artificial parallelism. Both
begin with a world bifurcated between mutually exclusive public and
private spheres.' ' To late nineteenth century conservatives, the pri-
mary threat to the private sphere was intrusion on property rights
through redistributive programs (such as bonding, regulation, or the
income tax).' 16 Contemporary conservatives still view the primary
threat to the private sphere as involving intrusion on private property
110. See Sullivan, The Economic Jurisprudence of the Burger Court's Antitrust Policy: The
First Thirteen Years, 58 NOTRE DAME LAW, I (1982); Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983
Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4, 58-60 (1984) (current
Supreme Court more informed about and sensitive to market impacts of their decisions than prior
courts). See also Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 592 (1985) (response to Easterbrook article); Easterbrook, Method, Results and Authority: A
Reply, 98 HARV. L. REV. 622 (1985) (rebuttal) [hereinafter cited as Method, Results].
I ll. See supra notes 74-88 and accompanying text.
112. Cf. Method, Results, supra note 110, at 622-27 ("All good things are scarce. Self-
interested conduct is the Handmaiden of Scarcity. These are facts of life").
113. Nowak's analysis runs into even greater problems of oversimplification. Nowak,
supra note 104, at 574-616.
114. PRIVATE PROPERTY, supra note 80, at 14-17 ("The most insidious, specious, and
therefore, dangerous" threats to private property involve government's power to tax; Dillon goes
on to attack the proposed income tax). Supply-siders notwithstanding, the argument that no prop-
erty is safe in the presence of a progressive income tax is today not a mainstream position.
115. Liberals also view the world as bifurcated between public and private, yet the paral-
lel terminology hides quite different basic concerns. Liberals' fears are focused on governmental
intrusion into "private" individual rights, see infra text accompanying notes 210-15; conservatives'
fears are focused on forced governmental redistribution by means of intrusion into the private
economic sphere.
116. See McCurdy, supra note 89, at 971 ("The simultaneous emergence of regulation,
repudiation, and revulsion against corporate privilege threatened a multitude of vested interests
on an unprecedented scale" after the Civil War).
1986:83
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rights, but the most common intrusions (in their view) now involve at-
tempts to protect civil rights, due process rights or other individual
rights. '
When all is said and done, the similarities between Dillon's social
vision and that of contemporary conservatives, while they should not
be exaggerated, cannot be ignored. Why then did Dillon and the Burger
Court generate contradictory formulations of city status?
2. THE TENSION BETWEEN NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURY
CONSERVATIVES' FORMULATIONS OF CITY STATUS
Recent decisions of the Burger Court provide an intriguing con-
trast to Dillon's basic framework of city powerlessness. In these recent
cases, the Court has used local sovereignty language to support an in-
ternal limit on the reach of the fourteenth amendment 1 8 and, for a
117. A veritable chorus of commentators has decried the Burger Court's lack of receptiv-
ity (relative to the Warren Court) to individual rights, see, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 82 (calling the
Burger Court "authoritarian, unduly beholden to the status quo, and insufficiently sensitive to
human rights and needs"); Lind, supra note 104, at 120 (Burger Court insufficiently sensitive to
first amendment); Shapiro, supra note 103, at 294 (Burger Court sides with the government,
against the individual, in cases involving individual rights); Comment, Federalism, Section 1983
and State Law Remedies: Curtailing the Federal Civil Rights Docket by Restricting the Underlying
Right, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 1035 (1982).
118. The Court deferred to localities' desire to exclude specific land uses in Warth v. Sel-
din, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (neither residents, nonresidents nor organizations have standing to sue
under the fourteenth amendment for remedy of exclusionary zoning); Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (plaintiff with standing to sue under Warth has no
remedy for exclusionary zoning under the fourteenth amendment because village's "intent" to
discriminate not adequately proven; case sets up "intent" test extremely difficult for plaintiffs to
meet); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (opinion by Justice Douglas, joined by
the Rehnquist majority) (zoning ordinance excluding student households withstands fourteenth
amendment "rational basis" test applied to economic and social legislation); James v. Valtierra,
402 U.S. 137 (1971) (absent showing of racial discrimination, requirement that all low-rent public
housing projects must be approved by a majority of voters does not violate the fourteenth amend-
ment, but instead fosters democratic decisionmaking; referendum requirement allowed town to
veto low-rent projects even if all zoning requirements were met); City of Eastlake v. Forest City
Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976) (provision in city charter providing that any changes in land use
agreed to by City Council must be approved by majority vote in a referendum, does not violate due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment; project at issue an apartment house); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (plurality opinion by Justice Stevens, joined by
the Rehnquist majority, upheld a zoning ordinance restricting the location of new theaters show-
ing sexually explicit movies); contra Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (zoning
ordinance restricting maintenance of extended family households violates due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment); Schad v. Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (zoning ordinance prohibiting
live entertainment violates free expression requirement of first and fourteenth amendments).
Other important cases involve issues of school desegregation and finance that the Supreme
Court majority and particularly Justice Burger, see Chesler, Imagery of Community, Ideology of
Authority: The Moral Reasoning of Chief Justice Burger, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 457 (1983),
characterizes as issues of local control. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973) (Texas school financing system based largely on the property tax satisfies the
"rational basis" test of fourteenth amendment equal protection clause); Milliken v. Bradley, 41 i
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time, to limit Congress' ability to regulate under the Commerce
Clause." 9 In sharp contrast to the traditional local government law
doctrines crystallized by Dillon, Burger Court decisions setting out the
principle of local government sovereignty reveal a pattern of solicitude
for localities' structural integrity and a broad judicial deference to their
programmatic choices.' 20 This Subsection begins- by setting out the
Burger Court cases and analyzing their use of Jeffersonian imagery.
Part b examines how the principle of local government sovereignty
functions rhetorically in a way similar to classical legal thought in gen-
eral, and Part c relates the principle to Dillon's formulation of city sta-
tus in particular.
a. The Burger Court's local sovereignty cases
The principle of local government sovereignty offers contempo-
rary conservatives a powerful rhetorical strategy because it allows them
to mobilize resonant Jeffersonian imagery. Thomas Jefferson, "the first,
and also the foremost, advocate of local self government," originated
the theory of local self-government.' 2 ' Like many of his contemporar-
U.S. 717 (1974) (absent showing that racially discriminatory acts of the state or a local district
were a substantial cause of interdistrict school segregation, no constitutional wrong exists to sup-
port an interdistrict remedy).
Other cases in which the Court has deferred to local decisionmaking include: Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (dicta imply limitations on federal courts' authority to remedy four-
teenth amendment due process violations in ways that interfere with local decisionmaking); Salyer
Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (special district voting
eligibility based on ownership of land and its assessed valuation does not violate fourteenth
amendment equal protection clause); Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) (equal protection clause of
fourteenth amendment is not violated by state statute limiting voting eligibility in special district
elections to landowners and apportioning voting strength according to the amount of land
owned). See also City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (198 1) (absent proof of discriminatory
intent, black residents of city foreclosed from claiming street closing violates equal protection
clause of fourteenth amendment); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (city's decision to
close public pool does not violate equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment).
In a few cases, the Supreme Court has refused to defer to local decisionmaking. E.g., Wright
v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972) (city's decision to withdraw from county
school system to avoid participation in desegregation plan violates equal protection clause of four-
teenth amendment); Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (vil-
lage ordinance limiting door-to-door solicitation of contributions by charitable organizations is
unconstitutionally overbroad, violating the first and fourteenth amendments); Hynes v. Mayor
and Council of Orodell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976) (municipal ordinance requiring advance notice be
given to local police department by persons soliciting from house-to-house for charitable or politi-
cal causes violates fourteenth amendment guarantees of free speech and due process of law);
Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 106 S.Ct. 1045 (1986) (Court struck down local ordinance forbidding
large political contributions to committees formed to support or oppose ballot measures).
119. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1975) (striking down congres-
sional statute enacted under the commerce clause), overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Auth., 105 S.Ct. 1005 (1985).
120. See Gelfand, supra note 2, at 764.
121. A. SYED, supra note 37, at 38.
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ies, Jefferson viewed all government as a potential threat to freedom.
Yet, most of his fears were focused upon the federal government,
whereas most of his hopes for democracy were focused on government
at a local level.
Jefferson's fear of the federal government dated back to the revolu-
tionary experience, which reinforced the long-standing English distrust
of centralized power. 22 Despite Jefferson's fierce advocacy of states'
rights, his actual concern was with their relative power. He was inter-
ested not so much in strengthening state governments as in weakening
the federal government. 123
Jefferson focused his aspirations for self-government at the local
level. He advocated division of counties into "wards" of five or six
square miles each. Each ward would function as a "little republic," ex-
ercising self-government in a broad range of duties. In 1816, Jefferson
said:
In government, as well as in every other business of life, it is
by division and subdivision of duties alone, that all matters,
great and small, can be managed to perfection .... And the
whole is cemented by giving to every citizen, personally, a part
in the administration of public affairs.' 24
Jefferson's linkage of local self-government and republican virtue has
proved an enormously influential source of political imagery since its
inception. As initially formulated, Jefferson's exaltation of local gov-
ernment did not apply to cities, which he abhorred. Jefferson envi-
sioned his localities as semi-rural farming communities where yeomen
met to agree on those matters that would be burdensome for each to
handle alone. 1
25
The Burger Court's principle of local sovereignty is heavily depen-
dent on imagery derived from the Jeffersonian tradition. Two distinct
themes emerge in the Court's Jeffersonian rhetoric. In one set of cases,
involving schools and zoning, the Burger Court has stressed the posi-
tive side of the Jeffersonian vision. These opinions, many of them writ-
ten by Justices Burger and Powell, will be called the "local autonomy
decisions." They consistently stress the virtues of "local autonomy,"
"community" and "local control" in terms that recall the Jeffersonian
122. See S. FINE, supra note 49, at 3-4 (discussing the doctrine of the "negative state").
123. A. SYED, supra note 37, at 41.
124. T. JEFFERSON, 1I THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 347 (P. Ford ed. 1905), quoted in
A. SYED, supra note 37, at 39.
125. See A. SYED, supra note 37, at 43-44. For additional documentation of Jefferson's
hostility to cities, see M. WHITE & L. WHITE, THE INTELLECTUAL VERSUS THE CITY 2-3, 12-19
(1962).
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romance with self-government at the local level. 12 6 Although Justice
Rehnquist joined these opinions, and has at times himself expressed
concern for local control, his own opinions stress a second aspect of the
Jeffersonian vision. While the local autonomy opinions stress the posi-
tive value of local control, Rehnquist stresses the negative consequences
of excessive federal power. 127 These two themes act in concert in Bur-
ger Court jurisprudence to provide a rationale for the existence of a
core area of local government sovereignty.
In the local autonomy opinions, the Court's Jeffersonian rhetoric
is used to support decisions that limit the scope of the fourteenth
amendment. Two important early examples were San Antonio v. Rodri-
guez128 (per Justice Powell) and Milliken v. Bradley' 29 (per Justice
Burger).
San Antonio v. Rodriguez illustrates the central role played by the
Court's Jeffersonian rhetoric in its abandonment of Warren Court ac-
tivism. Rodriguez involved a challenge to Texas' school financing sys-
tem, based largely on the property tax, which according to the plaintiffs
resulted in lower quality education for poorer children.' 30 The Rodri-
guez court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that laws relating to education
should be strictly scrutinized because education was a fundamental in-
terest, in an opinion that sharply curtailed the "fundamental interest"
analysis in constitutional law. '
3 1
For our purposes, the crucial part of Powell's opinion in Rodriguez
is not the decision's technical holding, but rather its use of the Jefferso-
nian rhetoric of local sovereignty as a rationale for limiting the reach of
the fourteenth amendment. Powell asserted that a major reason' 3 2 for
refusing to extend the equal protection clause to school financing was
his concern to preserve the autonomy of local schools, and of localities
in general:
126. For a systematic exploration of Chief Justice Burger's use of community imagery,
see Chesler, supra note 118, at 457-62. Chesler links Burger's imagery with the New England no-
tion of the homogenous "moral community." The relationship between the "moral community"
and Jefferson's theory of local self-government is an intriguing area for future study of the way
ideologies of diverse origins have converged in the jurisprudence of the Burger Supreme Court.
127. For a close analysis of Rehnquist's Jeffersonianism, see Powell, The Compleat Jeffer-
sonian: Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 YALE L. REv. 1317 (1982).
128. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
129. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
130. 411 U.S. 1, 1-12 (1973).
131. Id. at 33-38; see L. TRIBE, supra note 82, at 1002-11 (1978).
132. The Court gave two basic reasons for its holding that the fourteenth amendment was
not violated. First, it argued that wealth discrimination did not violate equal protection unless an
absolute, as opposed to a relative, deprivation resulted. 411 U.S. 1, at 23-25 (1973). Second, the
Court forwarded its local autonomy policy argument as an independent reason for relaxed mini-
mum rationality, as opposed to strict scrutiny, review.
1986:83
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[W]e stand on familiar ground when we continue to acknowl-
edge that the Justices of this Court lack both the expertise and
the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the making
of wise decisions with respect to the raising and disposition of
public revenues. Yet we are urged to direct the States either to
alter drastically the present system or to throw out the prop-
erty tax altogether in favor of some other form of taxation.
No scheme of taxation.., has yet been devised which is free of
all discriminatory impact. In such a complex arena in which
no perfect alternatives exist, the Court does well not to impose
too rigorous a standard of scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes
become subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection
Clause. 13
3
This passage starts out with the traditional incantation of the sanc-
tity of the state and the principle of federalism. But Powell's real focus
was on localities, as he readily made apparent by his reference to local
fiscal schemes. A notable irony is that the fiscal scheme involved in Rod-
riguez was not imposed on the local level: the plaintiffs were challenging
a mechanism of school financing imposed by the state of Texas. 134 Why
did Powell shy away from formulating the issue in Rodriguez as a clash
between state autonomy and federal requirements, and characterize the
case instead as involving issues of local autonomy?
1 35
The short answer is that established constitutional theory made it
difficult for the Court to argue that the scope of the fourteenth amend-
ment was constrained by considerations of autonomy. During the bat-
tle in the 1960's over whether the Bill of Rights had been incorporated
into the fourteenth amendment, Justices Frankfurter and Harlan ar-
gued that the Bill of Rights should not be applied to the states in the
interests of preserving the states as "laboratories" for innovation. Their
position was ultimately rejected by the majority of the Court. 1
36
133. Id. at 41.
134. Powell acknowledges this in his statement of the facts, 411 U.S. at 9-11, but blurs it
in the quoted portion of the opinion, in which he asserts that his opinion is designed to protect
local (as opposed to state) autonomy.
135. Another Powell opinion expressing concern for school districts' local autonomy is
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 217-53 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). See discussion in Durchslag, Federalism and Constitutional Liberties: Varying the
Remedy to Save the Right, 54 N.Y.U.L. REv. 723 (1979).
136. For descriptions of the "incorporation" controversy, see L. TRIBE, supra note 82, at
567-69; B. SCHWARTZ & L. LEsHma, supra note 101, at 395-400; Heck, Justice Brennan and the
Heyday of the Warren Court, 20 SANTA CLARA L. Rv. 841 (1980). The full text of the famous
"laboratories" quote is as follows: "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory." New State Ice v. Lieb-
man, 285 U.S. 262 (1932). The statement was originally made by Justice Brandeis in one of his
opinions dissenting from the Supreme Court's holdings striking down state legislation on substan-
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The outcome of the incorporation battle made it awkward for
Powell to argue that the fourteenth amendment's scope should be con-
stricted in the interest of preserving state autonomy. Powell's focus on
the need for the Court to defer to local autonomy is an attempt to avoid
this pitfall. The attempt fails because the Supreme Court has long since
accepted Dillon's principle that cities are mere subdivisions of the
states. If the need to preserve state autonomy is not a valid reason to
constrict the scope of the fourteenth amendment, the need to preserve
the autonomy of the state's (subservient) subdivisions surely is not a
valid consideration in limiting the amendment's reach.
Powell's incantation of the sanctity of local as opposed to state
autonomy submerges these difficult problems. They nonetheless persist,
for if states have absolute power over their subdivisions, and federal
courts have full authority to invade state sovereignty (including, pre-
sumably, the sovereignty of states' subdivisions) in order to enforce
constitutional mandates, it seems illogical for the Court to cite consid-
erations of local autonomy in constricting the scope of the fourteenth
amendment.
In Milliken v. Bradley, a second case that highlights the doctrinal
difficulties of the local autonomy opinions, Justice Burger used a rhe-
torical structure similar to that used by Powell in Rodriguez. Milliken
involved a federal court order to desegregate Detroit schools. Because
Detroit's school-age population was overwhelmingly black, the district
court ordered a metropolitan-wide remedy that involved busing city
children into the suburbs, where most students were white. The Court,
in an opinion written by Justice Burger, reversed the district court or-
der, noting:
No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted
than local control over the operation of schools; local auton-
omy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance
of community concern and support for public schools and to
the quality of the educational process. 1
3 7
This language is reminiscent of Powell's Jeffersonian rhetoric in Rodri-
guez. Moreover, it functions in a similar way. The local sovereignty lan-
guage in Rodriguez was used to support creation of an internal limit on
tive due process grounds. Because Brandeis supported regulation of business, he championed
states' rights.
Brandeis' statement was quoted by Justice Harlan in the very different context of the incor-
poration controversy. Harlan argued that application of the Bill of Rights to the states would
eliminate the states' status as social laboratories. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (federal constitution's right of trial by jury applies to states through the
fourteenth amendment).
137. 418 U.S. at 741-42.
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the coverage of the fourteenth amendment. In Milliken, similar lan-
guage was used to limit a court's ability to remedy a constitutional
violation.
The analysis in Milliken highlights the acute doctrinal tension be-
tween Dillon's formulation of city status and the Court's local sover-
eignty principle. Milliken holds that although courts are free to enforce
the fourteenth amendment against the states, they cannot enforce it
against local government units in a way that treats those units as enti-
ties of "mere administrative convenience." Yet according to Dillon's
formulation of municipal law, that is exactly what local units are: not
only school districts, but also general-purpose governments such as cit-
ies, are units of "mere administrative convenience." 1 ' Under munici-
pal law, the boundaries of school districts, and of cities as well, may be
rewritten by states at will.
Milliken v. Bradley and San Antonio v. Rodriguez appear to rein-
vigorate Cooley's argument1 3 9 (expressly rejected by state courts in the
period 1870-1900) that a core of local government sovereignty should
be accorded constitutional status. These cases conflict sharply with Dil-
lon's premise that the people delegated all their sovereignty to the
states. Yet, these cases explicitly embrace Dillon's basic tenet that cities
are subdivisions of the states. 140 Consequently, a central contradiction
recurs: if local units such as municipalities and school districts are mere
subdivisions of the states, how can their inviolable core of local sover-
eignty function to limit federal courts' ability to enforce fourteenth
amendment mandates on the states? Perhaps the Court senses the se-
vere doctrinal difficulties in Milliken and Rodriguez, for in neither case
is its deference to local autonomy elevated to the level of a formal hold-
ing. Instead, in both cases-and in the other cases discussed below-the
quasi-constitutional principle of local sovereignty serves to divert atten-
tion from the fact that established federalism principles are not avail-
able to justify constrictions on the ability of plaintiffs to recover under
the fourteenth amendment.
138. Contemporary usage groups general-purpose local governments (villages, towns, cit-
ies) and special-purpose units (school districts, water districts, fire districts et. al.) under the gen-
eral word "municipalities" or "localities." See E. McQuillin, supra note 47, at 130-32. Dillon clas-
sified both groups as public corporations but he distinguished between general-purpose local
government units, which he considered "municipal" corporations and special-purpose units,
which he did not. J. DILLON, supra note 4, at 30.
139. Although the scope of Cooley's "inherent sovereignty" doctrine was never entirely
clear, see Gere, supra note 37, at 285-87, he probably intended localities to exercise sole control
over local affairs. Given the tradition of local control over schools, control over schools presuma-
bly would be included within towns' inherent powers.
140. See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 727 (Burger quotes with approval trial court holding that
school board is a "subordinate entity of the state"). The traditional analysis also underlies Powell's
failure to identify clearly whether the state or localities are involved in Rodriguez: since cities are
mere creatures of the state, it doesn't matter.
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Rodriguez and Milliken are part of a larger trend in which the Bur-
ger Court extols local autonomy to constrict the scope of the fourteenth
amendment. Many of these cases involve zoning. In six cases, the right
of a municipality to zone out low- and moderate-income people, 141 stu-
dent households, 142 and pornographic theaters 143 has been upheld in
the face of fourteenth amendment challenges. In two additional cases,
the conservative members of the Court joined dissenting opinions up-
holding towns' right to zone out extended families 1 44 and nude
dancing. 145
Like the opinions in Milliken and Rodriguez, many of the zoning
opinions use explicit Jeffersonian imagery. Two notable examples are
Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Schad v. Mt. Ephraim
14 6
and the Court's majority opinion in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas.'
4 7
In Schad, Burger argued that a zoning ordinance prohibiting nude
dancing should be upheld in the face of due process and first amend-
ment challenges. His opinion could not be more explicit in its rhetoric
of local control: "a community of people are-within limits-masters
of their own environment.... Citizens should be free to choose to shape
their community so that it embodies the conception of the 'decent
life.' ,,14 In extremely broad dicta reminiscent of Cooley's doctrine of
inherent sovereignty, 149 Burger asserted in Schad that communities
should have broad control over "local concerns."' 50
In Belle Terre, the Court once again used the Jeffersonian imagery
of community values and local control in upholding an ordinance ex-
cluding student households. The Court said that towns should be al-
141. Low- and moderate-income people: Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137
(1971); Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668 (1976). In the latter two cases, the Court
upheld the referendum requirements at issue despite prior holdings that a referendum cannot be
used to circumvent federal constitutional requirements. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). Contra Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976)
(comprehensive metropolitan-wide program to desegregate Chicago's public housing sustained
despite Milliken v. Bradley).
142. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring) (student
households).
143. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding zoning ordi-
nance restricting location of new theaters showing sexually explicit movies).
144. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 531 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing
that town ordinance-excluding extended families should be upheld). Chief Justice Burger also
voted to uphold the ordinance, on the ground that federal courts are too busy to decide such cases,
given the plaintiff grandmother's failure to seek a zoning variance. Id. at 521 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
145. Schad v. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 85 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
146. Id.
147. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
148. 452 U.S. at 87.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 35-39.
150. 452 U.S. at 87.
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lowed "to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the
blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for
people."" '' For the Burger Court majority, which joined Justice
Douglas' Belle Terre'5 2 opinion, the case was consonant with the five
other decisions upholding exclusionary zoning in the interest of local
control. '53
In the zoning opinions discussed above, the Court set up a rhetori-
cal universe in which the exclusionary choices of municipalities are can-
onized as self-rule, while fourteenth amendment mandates are charac-
terized as intrusive central government controls.' 54 The Court's use of
Jeffersonian rhetoric serves to blur the underlying issue of how to define
the "community" entitled to self-determination. Of the myriad possible
"communities" available-from the neighborhood to the nation-the
Court chose to focus its solicitude upon predominantly white, relatively
affluent suburbs that were opposing the introduction of low- and mod-
erate-income housing or other "undesirable" uses.1 55 The Court's im-
151. 416 U.S. at 9.
152. Justice Douglas' opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist,
Stewart, Powell, Blackmun and White. Justices Marshall and Brennan wrote dissenting opinions.
Zoning experts have expressed surprise that Justice Douglas should have sided with the
Rehnquist majority in Belle Terre. See N. WILLIAMS, JR., 3 AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW §
66.34 (1974). Douglas' opinion, however, illustrates his strong commitment to a constitutional
right to privacy. Justice Douglas incorporated into contemporary constitutional law the constitu-
tional right to privacy first articulated by Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451,467
(1952) (Douglas, J. dissenting) (Douglas asserts that music on streetcars violates right to privacy);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (the most famous right to privacy case). One senses in Belle
Terre the tension between Douglas' populism and his commitment to a right to privacy.
153. See supra notes 141-43.
154. The Burger Court opinions upholding referendums that impose requirements with
exclusionary effects stress the importance of direct participation in decisionmaking at a local level,
thereby mobilizing the Jeffersonian view (which also underlies the zoning cases discussed in the
text) that government becomes more trustworthy the closer it is to the people. See Eastlake v.
Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 673 (1976); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 143 (1971) ("This
procedure ensures that all the people of a community will have a voice in a decision which may
lead to large expenditures of local government funds for increased public services and to lower tax
revenues. It gives them a voice in decisions that will affect the future development of their own
community"). The analysis also underlies certain other cases that make no explicit reference to
Jeffersonian values, such as Warth v. Seldin and Arlington Heights.
155. The dissent in Schad (per Burger) described the town as "a small enclave... a placid
'bedroom' community," 452 U.S. at 84. In Belle Terre the village is described as "a middle class,
suburban residential community," 416 U.S. at 10. In Moore, the majority referred to the commu-
nity involved as "white suburbia," 431 U.S. at 508. Arlington Heights involved a suburb of Chi-
cago, forty percent of whose population is black, in which only 27 of the 64,000 residents were
black at the time the case was decided. 429 U.S. at 558; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF
COMMERCE, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING P.-2, P-247 (1983). The plaintiffs in
Eastlake argued that the primary motive behind the town's zoning provision was to "build walls
against the ills, poverty, racial strife, and the people themselves, of our areas.. " creating "a
veritable choke collar against change in the large lot, single family, residential use." Brief for
Respondent at 9-10, Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668 (1976). In Warth v. Seldin, the
ordinance was enacted by the town of Penfield, a suburb of Chicago. The U.S. Census Report
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agery is powerful because, whereas an argument defending the self-de-
termination of an individual bigot is no longer a strong rhetorical
position, the need to preserve a town's right to control its community
life, without conformity enforced by Big Brother, resonates with perva-
sive contemporary concerns. 156
This discussion shows that important doctrinal contradictions per-
sist throughout the local autonomy cases. The Court has generally dealt
with these difficulties by ignoring them. In National League of Cities v.
Usery, 1 5 7 Justice Rehnquist confronted these issues directly and offered
a potential solution.
National League of Cities, beloved of legal commentators, 158 is no
doubt familiar to most readers. It involved a Congressional enactment
that extended the minimum wage to state and local employees. The de-
cision by Justice Rehnquist overruled a precedent decided only eight
years earlier 1 59 and struck down the statute. The decision stunned the
legal community for several reasons. The most important was that Na-
tional League of Cities, for the first time in forty years, struck down a
Congressional statute regulating commerce as an unconstitutional in-
trusion on state sovereignty.' 60 The case outraged many observers,
who foresaw a new Lochner era,161 and delighted certain others, be-
cause it provided a variety of perspectives from which to tease Justice
Rehnquist. 1
62
showed that in 1970, of the 23,782 people residing in Penfield, only 60 were members of minority
groups. Brief for Petitioners at 2, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
156. The reference to Big Brother refers, of course, to George Orwell's 1984. G. ORWELL,
NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949).
157. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Auth., 105 S.Ct. 1005 (1985).
158. A sampling of the voluminous commentary: Percy, National League of Cities v.
Usery: The Tenth Amendment is Alive and Doing Well, 51 TUL. L. REV. 95 (1976); Tribe, Unraveling
National League of Cities. The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government
Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Unraveling NLC]; Phillips, The Declin-
ing Fortunes of National League of Cities v. Usery, 21 Am. Bus. L.J. 89 (1983); Schwartz, National
League of Cities Revisited: Is the Quondam Constitutional Mountain Turning Out to be only a Judi-
cial Molehill?, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 329 (1983); Bartow, Safeguarding Federalism-Changing Con-
ceptions of the Judicial Role: From NLC to EEOC and Beyond, 55 TEMP. L.Q. 889 (1982);
Monaghan, The Burger Court and "Our Federalism," 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 40 (1980);
Moore, Federalism, Racism and Yahooism, 29 Loy. L. REv. 936 (1983).
159. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 201 (1968).
160. The Lochner Court stopped striking down statutes enacted under the Commerce
Clause in the mid-1930s. See L. TRIBE, supra note 82, at 450-55.
161. See, e.g., Schwartz, National League of Cities v. Usery-The Commerce Power and
Stare Sovereignty Redivivus, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1115 (1978); Heldt, The Tenth Amendment Ice-
berg, 30 HASTINGS L. J. 1763 (1979).
162. See, e.g., Unraveling NLC, supra note 158; cf Michelman, States' Rights and States'
Roles: Permutations of 'Sovereignty' in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165
(1977).
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National League of Cities addressed directly the issue the Court
had skirted in Rodriguez and Milliken. These cases did not resolve the
question of how local sovereignty could function as a limitation on fed-
eral power over states if cities were mere subdivisions of the states. Na-
tional League of Cities did, by holding that the tenth amendment func-
tioned as a constitutional limit on federal power over state (and,
consequently, local) governments. 163 The tenth amendment, which had
not been heard from in years, asserts that the states reserve to them-
selves all rights not given to the federal government. 164 Rehnquist
parlayed this into a holding that Congress, acting under the Commerce
Clause, could not act in a way that jeopardized a state's ability to fulfill
"traditional governmental functions." 165
National League of Cities offered a solution to the problem pre-
sented in the local autonomy cases. It held that local autonomy served
as a limit on the federal government because the tenth amendment lim-
ited federal power over the ability of states to fulfill essential govern-
mental functions.' 
66
Although National League of Cities offered a way of resolving the
internal contradictions in the Burger Court local sovereignty cases, its
potential was never realized. National League of Cities was decided in
1975; by 1976, the Burger Court had held in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer 16 7 that
the tenth amendment did not serve as an internal limit on the four-
teenth amendment. In 1985, only a decade after it was handed down,
National League of Cities was decisively overruled. 168 These develop-
ments have robbed the Burger Court's principle of local sovereignty of
a firm doctrinal basis. Given that the fourteenth amendment is pre-
mised on the ability of courts to invade states' sovereignty in order to
vindicate federal constitutional rights, how can the sovereignty of a
163. 426 U.S. at 842-43.
164. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
165. 426 U.S. at 852.
166. Whereas Powell and Burger formulated the clash as one between local autonomy
and federal power, Rehnquist formulated the clash in National League of Cities as one between
state and federal power, despite the fact that his examples of functions traditionally served by the
states were of services traditionally provided largely by local government. Included in Rehnquist's
list were fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation. 426
U.S. 833, 851. Figures compiled by the U.S. Department of Commerce show that these functions
all either carried out primarily or exclusively by local governments. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE AND LOCAL ROLES IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 7 (1982).
Thus, Burger and Powell characterize the clash as one between the federal and local govern-
ments, even when a state (not local) financing system is involved, see supra text accompanying
notes 134-37, whereas Rehnquist characterizes the clash as between the federal and state govern-
ments, even when local (not state) services are involved. The difference in characterization pro-
vides a vivid illustration of the way courts manipulate their analysis of city status to reach the
desired results.
167. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
168. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S.Ct. 1005 (1985).
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state's "mere subdivision" limit the fourteenth amendment's reach? Af-
ter Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and the overruling of National League of Cities,
arguments advocating limits on the scope of the fourteenth amendment
in order to preserve local autonomy appear weak indeed.
In summary, the Burger Court has often used Jeffersonian rhetoric
to limit the power of the federal government by arguing that federal
courts cannot invade the sphere of local control. Justice Rehnquist in
National League of Cities made a similar argument-that the federal
legislature could not invade the sphere of local sovereignty. The next
Subsection will show how both principles function as political forum-
shifting arguments.
b. The local sovereignty principle as a forum-shifting argument similar
to those in classical legal thought
The rhetorical structure of both classical legal thought and the ju-
risprudence of the Burger Court majority flows from an initial, cardinal
premise: that a court's task in judging cases is to make technical, legal
judgments, not political ones.' 69 This stance necessitates a jurispru-
dence that allows judges to decide cases without direct reference to their
political values. This goal is often easy to accomplish' 7 ° but becomes
awkward in cases contemporaries view as inherently political.
As was noted above, one rhetorical strategy used in classical legal
thought was the theory of powers absolute within their spheres. This
strategy allowed courts to strike down a maximum hour law or a pro-
posed city activity, not on explicit laissez-faire grounds, but on the
grounds that the state legislature or the city did not have the "author-
ity" to make the policy choice in question. Thus, maximum hour laws
were held unconstitutional because the people had not delegated to
state legislatures the power to pass them (Lochner); 1 " nor had the state
delegated to cities authority to undertake a wide range of other activi-
ties of which the court disapproved (Dillon's Rule). ' 72 In each case, a
169. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
170. The claim that judges' choices are technical, not political ones, is relatively easy to
support, for example, when the case involves, the "mailbox rule." See, e.g., Morrison v. Thoelke,
155 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1963).
171. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905). The Court's holding that the New
York statute violated the fourteenth amendment was, in essence, a holding that the people had not
delegated to the legislature the right to pass the statute. The basic constitutional analysis, rarely
articulated, is that the people have delegated to the legislature the ability to act in a broad range of
contexts, but not the power to violate the people's constitutional rights. (The people reserved to
themselves the right of free speech, right to practice their religion, and other constitutional rights).
172. See, e.g., Sears v. Ogden City, 533 P.2d 118 (Utah 1975) (statute declaring that a city
may "purchase, receive, hold, sell, lease, convey and dispose of property, real and personal, for the
benefit of the city ... and may do all other things in relation thereto as natural persons" held
insufficient to authorize city to convey a vacated street to the local school district without consider-
1986:83
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judgment of political appropriateness was transformed into the techni-
cal issue of whether the legal actor involved had the authority to make
the policy choice in question. 
173
The Burger Court majority has proceeded in many instances in a
similar fashion, turning hotly contested policy issues into questions of
whether a given legal actor is acting within its proper sphere. Thus, the
question of how much free medical care hospitals should provide the
poor becomes a question of whether the issue can properly be raised in
court by a given plaintiff; 174 the question of what constitutes proper
criminal procedures becomes a question of whether the issue should be
decided by the state or federal courts.' 75
The Court's principle of local government sovereignty functions in
a similar way. It turns a wide range of substantive policy questions into
questions of whether the federal government has the power to enforce
constitutional mandates' 76 or pass contested legislation, 1 77 or whether
it is precluded from doing so because the problems at issue cannot be
solved without violating local sovereignty. Like Dillon's Rule and its
accompanying doctrines, the Court's principle of local government sov-
ereignty functions as a political forum-shifting argument. It limits the
power of the federal government-the level of government that con-
temporary conservatives consider the greatest threat-through an ar-
gument that the locality has sole authority to make the challenged pol-
icy decisions. In the school cases discussed above, for example, the
Court held that the federal government lacked power to forbid large
ation); Ives v. Chicago, 30 Ill. 2d 582, 198 N.E.2d 518 (1964) (statute authorizing city to regulate
building construction, safety, and inspection standards held insufficient to authorize licensing of
building contractors based on examinations as to competency); Glenview Rural Fire Protection
Dist. v. Raymond, 19 Ill. App. 3d 272, 311 N.E.2d 302 (1974) (statute authorizing board of trust-
ees of fire protection districts "to provide as nearly adequate protection from fire for all persons
and property ... and to prescribe necessary regulations for the prevention and control of fire" held
insufficient to authorize the enactment of regulations requiring installation of automatic sprinkling
systems in common areas of apartment buildings).
173. This is not to say that, during the Lochner era, the Supreme Court was never explicit
about the political value judgments that underlay its jurisprudence. Sometimes it was very explicit.
See, e.g., Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 165-66 (1908) (Lochner era decision concerning the rela-
tionship of federal and state courts, stating explicitly that the decision was necessary to protect
property rights), quoted in Weschler, Federal Courts, State Criminal Law and the First Amendment,
49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 740, 762 (1974).
174. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976). See also Linda v.
Richard, 410 U.S. 614 (1973); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
175. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See L. TRIBE, supra note 82, at 152-56.
176. See supra note 118 (cases cutting back on the fourteenth amendment in deference to
local policy choices, sometimes using explicit Jeffersonian rhetoric to establish that the activities at
issue are properly in the sphere of local control).
177. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (federal statute extending
coverage of minimum wage law struck down on grounds that Congress cannot legislate to control
matters properly within the sphere of the states), overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 105 S.Ct. 1005 (1985).
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disparities in-funding of local schools (Rodriguez), or to impose a met-
ropolitan-wide desegregation scheme (Milliken). The Court leaves no
doubt, however, that the local governments involved could change their
programmatic choices to meet the plaintiffs' concerns. 78
The Court has used its forum-shifting local sovereignty argument
to defer to local political and programmatic choices in a wide range of
other contexts.' 79 The most famous example is Rizzo v. Goode' 80 a case
in which the plaintiffs alleged brutality by the Philadelphia police. Jus-
tice Rehnquist's formal holding was that Rizzo presented no case or
controversy.' 8' However, his opinion gained attention primarily be-
cause it seemed to imply that federal courts had no authority to enjoin
allegedly unconstitutional police conduct since principles of federalism
precluded intervention in delicate local policy matters best left to local
control. 82 In Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake, another Rehnquist opin-
ion, the Court once again weighed an alleged fourteenth amendment
violation against the defendants' interest in local control. 183 Tulare
Lake upheld a provision that only property owners could vote1 84 in
local water district elections, noting that the California legislature could
reasonably have concluded that landowners were entitled to local
control. 8 5
In each case, whether it involved schools, zoning or other local
political or programmatic choices, the Court used its local sovereignty
principle as a forum-shifting argument to defer to local control. Yet, as
commentators have pointed out, the Burger Court does not always de-
178. Both cases clearly formulate the issue involved as one of whether the federal govern-
ment can impose its will on local officials. If local officials themselves choose to meet the plaintiffs'
demands voluntarily, the opinions' language strongly suggests that the Court would be as deferen-
tial to that decision as it is to the localities' decision to fight the plaintiffs' demands.
179. See supra notes 141-56 (discussing zoning cases).
180. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
181. Id. at 372-73.
182. Id. at 375-76, 380. A subsequent case citing Rizzo provides an excellent illustration of
how Rehnquist has used the rhetoric of local sovereignty to further his jurisprudential goals. In
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), the Court, citing Rizzo, held that no case or
controversy existed in the so-called "chokehold case," involving a challenge to police use of
"chokeholds" in contexts in which the police had not been threatened with violence. The Lyons
opinion did not contain the Jeffersonian rhetoric of local control contained in Rizzo; it simply cited
Rizzo as established precedent. Nonetheless, one suspects that Rehnquist's local autonomy rheto-
ric in Rizzo was helpful in gaining a majority for the opinion.
183. 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
184. The challenged system gave votes proportional to acreage owned, id. at 730-31, so
the plaintiffs (who leased their land) were disfranchised, id. at 731-33.
185. Id., at 731. Note that Salyer's holding, which appeared to apply only to localized
special districts that offered a very limited range of services, was vastly expanded in Ball v. James,
451 U.S. 355 (1981). See also Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981)
(Rehnquist opinion in which the Court, citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), upholds local
assessment practices, stressing the need to avoid "intrusiveness" by federal courts, 454 U.S. at
114).
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fer to community autonomy. 1 86 The Burger Court, like Dillon, uses
political forum-shifting arguments to accomplish specific political
goals. The following Subsection pinpoints the contexts in which the
Court defers to local control.
c. The political values underlying the Burger Court's local sovereignty
cases
The Burger Court's rhetorical strategy is similar to Dillon's; so too
are its underlying political goals. Dillon's central goal was to limit gov-
ernment power that threatened property rights through redistributive
programs disruptive of the natural functioning of the economy. This
Subsection discusses the related political values served by the Burger
Court's local sovereignty principle.
To grasp the practical impact of the justices' Jeffersonian rhetoric
in the local autonomy cases, one must return to basic demographics. By
1970, the intertwined issues of racial and economic discrimination had
become closely linked with the fight between city and suburb. 18 7 As
cities became poorer and blacker, and suburbs became richer and
whiter, housing and school discrimination issues took on a city/suburb
dynamic in many metropolitan areas. '8  The Court has used the princi-
ple of local autonomy to refuse relief for discrimination in housing or
schools whenever such relief requires changes in a city's basic metropol-
itan structure. The Court's local sovereignty principle enabled it to evis-
cerate fourteenth amendment equal protection requirements in the
large number of cases in which discrimination in housing or schools
cannot be remedied without alteration of local boundaries or local
duties.' 89
186. 454 U.S. 290 (1981). For example, in Fisher v. Berkeley, 106 S.Ct. 1045 (1986), the
Court struck down a local ordinance forbidding large political contributions to committees
formed to support or oppose ballot measures. Burger's solicitude for local autonomy was notable
in its absence when Berkeley used its autonomy to attempt to preserve rent control.
187. For an example of the close relationship between racial and economic discrimina-
tion, see Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d
390 (1983), (Mt. Laurel II) 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975) (Mt. Laurel 1) (brought as both an
economic and a race discrimination case; decided on grounds of economic discrimination).
188. In 1981 blacks comprised 57.2% of the central city population while the percentage
of whites was only 24.6%. In the suburbs, only 18.7% of the population was black, with whites
comprising 33.8%, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 27 (1984). The mean income of urban black households was $15,585, com-
pared to a mean income of $28,023 for white suburban households. Id. at 461. In addition, 34.4%
of inner city blacks were living below the poverty level compared to only 11.4% of inner city
whites. Id. See also ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CENTRAL CITY,
SUBURBAN FISCAL DISPARITY 5, 8 (1977).
189. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 735 (1974) (federal district court barred from
ordering metropolitan-wide school desegregation plan despite the finding that any less compre-
hensive a solution than a metropolitan area plan would result in an all-black school system imme-
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The Court's use of the local sovereignty principle to protect subur-
ban spheres in some sense parallels Dillon's use of his formulation of
city status. 190 Both served to protect private property (the taxpayer's
wallet or the suburban enclave) against redistributive intrusions-taxa-
tion to finance bonds (in the case of Dillon) or federal courts' efforts to
enforce constitutional requirements (in the Burger Court opinions).
The values underlying Rehnquist's local sovereignty cases parallel
Dillon's even more closely. In Tulare Lake, for example, Rehnquist per-
suaded the Court to defer to a local decision that allowed only property
owners to vote, a holding that mirrors Dillon's attempts to protect pri-
vate property. Similarly, in National League of Cities, Rehnquist used
local autonomy principles to limit the reach of the minimum wage/max-
imum hour legislation; the parallels with Lochner are striking. In both
instances, Rehnquist's concern to protect the power of private property
is reminiscent of the goals Dillon articulated in Hanson v. Vernon,
which undergirded the laissez-faire constitutionalism of the Lochner
Court.
Rehnquist shares with the local autonomy cases a desire to limit
the power of the federal courts.' 9 1 His rhetoric of local control is one
aspect of his larger project of introducing federalism as an internal limit
on federal court jurisdiction in a wide range of contexts, and on Con-
gress as well. The broad principle articulated in Rizzo v. Goode, 92 that
the ability of federal courts to remedy individual rights should be
sharply limited in any context in which a remedy might interfere with
local autonomy, arguably creates a sphere of local control much
broader than that created by the local autonomy cases.
diately surrounded by practically all-white suburban school systems); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490 (1975) (virtually no plaintiff with an incentive to sue [except a developer who has already spent
substantial sums on a project] has standing to challenge exclusionary zoning); Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (developer who had spent substantial sums on a project
has not shown that town's exclusionary zoning was motivated by an intent to discriminate); James
v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (upholding requirement that low-rent housing be approved by a
majority of voters); Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976) (upholding require-
ment that multifamily housing be approved by a super-majority of voters). San Antonio v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), also fits this pattern. In precluding equal protection claims against school
financing systems based on the property tax, the decision allowed homogenous, affluent suburbs to
buy high-quality schools for their own children, while center-city schools remained with much
lower rates of funding per pupil, due to the high proportion of poor living in central cities in
substandard housing that yields lower levels of property tax.
190. Note that the Supreme Court, like Jefferson himself, has not used the Jeffersonian
rhetoric of local control to argue for local control of cities. See supra text accompanying notes 124-
25.
191. See generally Nichol, Backing Into the Future: The Burger Court and the Federal
Forum, 30 KAN. L. REV. 341 (1982) (good comprehensive treatment); Weinberg, The New Judicial
Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1191 (1977) (limitations on federal injunctive power); Freilich, Ac-
concia & Martin, Judicial Federalism and State Sovereignty, 16 URB. LAW. 539, 542-56 (1984)
(discussing Pennhurst 111).
192. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
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Rehnquist's most ambitious use of Jeffersonian rhetoric appears in
National League of Cities, where he persuaded a majority of the Court
to invalidate a Congressional statute regulating commerce as an uncon-
stitutional intrusion on state sovereignty for the first time in forty
years.' 93 The striking fact is not that National League of Cities was
overruled 94 but that the opinion was ever handed down. It is an indi-
cation of the power of Rehnquist's Jeffersonian rhetoric that he could
persuade a majority of the Court in National League of Cities to join
him in challenging the strongest taboo in contemporary constitutional
jurisprudence in a way they shortly thereafter found embarrassing.195
Yet, the resonance of Jeffersonian rhetoric should not be allowed to
overshadow the doctrinal difficulties that result when the rhetoric is
combined with existing constitutional and municipal law principles.
II. LOCALITIES' LEGAL STATUS AND LIBERALS' FEAR OF
GOVERNMENTAL POWER
Justice Brennan's opinions expanding the potential liability of lo-
cal governments in section 1983,196 antitrust, 197 and inverse condem-
nation suits 198 form an important contrast with the Burger Court's lo-
193. National League of Cities was virtually the first instance of Supreme Court invalida-
tion of economic legislation on constitutional grounds since the Lochner approach was abandoned
in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
194. Garcia v. San Antonio Transit, 105 S.Ct. 1005 (1985).
195. To be less formalistic, Justice Rehnquist persuaded Justice Blackmun in a way
Blackmun later found embarrassing. In Garcia, Blackmun gives many indications that he is frus-
trated and embarrassed, primarily over unsuccessful attempts to define traditional governmental
functions, see, e.g., 105 S.Ct. at 1011 ("Thus far this Court has made little headway in defining the
scope of governmental functions deemed protected under NLC"); with attempts to correlate tradi-
tional functions with the governmental/proprietary distinction, 105 S.Ct. 1015. ("To say that the
distinction between 'governmental' and 'proprietary' proved to be stable, however, would be
something of an overstatement .... It was this uncertainty and instability that led the Court... to
conclude that the distinction between 'governmental' and 'proprietary' functions was untenable
and must be abandoned"); and with other available standards, 105 S.Ct. 1016 ("Neither do any of
the alternative standards that might be employed to distinguish between protected and unpro-
tected governmental functions appear manageable").
196. Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (munici-
palities not immune from § 1983 suits); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (munic-
ipalities have no good faith immunity from § 1983 suits). See infra text accompanying notes 222-
44.
197. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978) (municipali-
ties not automatically exempted from the antitrust laws); Community Communications Co. v.
City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982) (home rule cities not automatically exempt from the antitrust
laws). See infra text accompanying notes 245-68. Note that these cases have been partially over-
ruled by statute. Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750
(1984) (statute limiting antitrust suits against municipalities to injunctive relief). See also Town of
Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S.Ct. 1713 (1985) (detailing test locality must meet for its action to
qualify as state action immune from the antitrust laws).
198. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981) (Brennan,
J., dissenting). See infra text accompanying notes 269-84.
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cal sovereignty decisions. Justice Brennan shows little of the concern
for local government sovereignty evidenced by the conservative Burger
Court majority. On the contrary, Brennan often relies heavily upon the
principle established by Dillon that cities have no inherent
sovereignty.' 99
Justice Brennan's opinions do more than simply cite Dillon's basic
constitutional analysis. Knowledgeable observers believe that if
Brennan's positions were to predominate, American cities would lose
much of the independence they gained at the turn of the century when
home rule statutes gave cities broad authority over local affairs.2 ° °
The deep rift between the Burger Court majority's local sover-
eignty decisions and Justice Brennan's municipal liability opinions has
not been widely noted.20 1 An analysis that separates Brennan's deci-
sions from those of the Burger Court majority makes both sets of opin-
ions more comprehensible. Both sets of opinions reflect an attitude
toward municipalities that is a function of their desire to rein in exces-
sive governmental power. Not surprisingly, the justices focus on very
different scenarios of potential governmental abuse. Whereas the Bur-
199. The tradition of Progressive support for city sovereignty is what makes Justice
Brennan's insistence on cities' constitutional subservience so surprising and disturbing to liberal
commentators. Rogers, Municipal Antitrust Liability in a Federal System, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 305;
Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action" After Lafayette, 95 HARV. L. REv. 435 (1981). See,
e.g., City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412-13; City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 53-54 ("we are a nation of
States, a principle that makes accommodation for sovereign subdivisions of States").
200. The Progressives led the campaign for passage of home rule provisions. For exam-
ples of Progressive home rule literature, see H. MCBAIN, supra note 37, at 6-28; F. GOODNOW,
supra note 37, at 7-10 (1985). Only the first generation of home rule provisions was designed to give
cities control over local affairs. More recent provisions have often granted to cities the power to
undertake any action not in conflict with state law.
Commentators generally agree that courts have often construed home rule grants more
narrowly that their drafters intended, see, e.g., Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L.
REv. 1057 (1980); Comment, Municipal Corporations-Legislative Control of Municipal Acts,
Rights and Liabilities-Home Rule Cities Lack Authority to Create Random Forms of Government,
57 N.D.L. REV. 655 (1981); Vanlandingham, Constitutional Municipal Home Rule Since the AMA
(NLC) Model, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 (1975). This is another aspect of cities' constitutional
vulnerability.
The home rule provisions were designed, in effect, to overrule Dillon's Rule and its accom-
panying doctrines, by enacting Cooley's doctrine of independent sovereignty. See Gere, supra note
37, at 279-81. Around the turn of the 20th century, many Progressives argued that courts should
adopt Cooley's formulation rather than Dillon's. See, e.g., Eaton, supra note 37 (influential series
of articles arguing in favor of the doctrine of inherent sovereignty). By the 1930's, some influential
Progressives saw the attempt to argue in favor of the Cooley doctrine as futile. They argued in-
stead that home rule was necessary because Dillon's Rule and its accompanying doctrines were so
firmly entrenched. See, e.g., H. MCBAIN, supra note 37, at 15-17.
201. Those commentators who have contrasted the local sovereignty decisions and the
municipal liability cases have used approaches very different from the one used in this Article.
David Gelfand's groundbreaking though somewhat formalistic analysis concludes that the Burger
Court has deferred to local sovereignty in cases involving statutes (the § 1983 cases and antitrust
cases, as well as several cases involving 1960s vintage civil rights statutes) but not in cases where
claims are based directly on the Constitution. See Gelfand, supra note 2, at 800.
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ger Court majority identifies forced governmental redistribution as the
greatest potential threat, 20 2 Justice Brennan is concerned with the
threat of governmental intrusion on individual rights. 20 3 This Section
shows how Justice Brennan's municipal liability opinions are a by-
product of his battle with Justice Rehnquist over the scope of federal
plaintiffs' civil rights remedies.
A. Justice Brennan's Political Philosophy and Jurisprudence
"He just blew up. I think his exact words were 'He's done it
again. He's pulled another one.' "
New Jersey Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt responding to
news of President Eisenhower's appointment of Brennan to
the Supreme Court.20
"His critics put it simply, if crudely: Earl Warren was mon-
grelizing America from within, and he was selling it to the
Communists from without.",
20 5
Brennan was appointed to the Supreme Court because he was
Catholic and a Democrat.20 6 It soon became clear he was also a liberal.
Brennan became a staunch ally of Chief Justice Earl Warren (another
Eisenhower appointee) and Warren's closest personal friend on the
Court.20 7 Brennan's appointment gave Warren a solid core of four
votes, and, for the first time, a fluctuating majority in favor of an ac-
tivist approach.
20 1
202. See supra notes 190-95 and accompanying text.
203. See infra notes 210-15 and accompanying text.
204. L. KATCHER, EARL WARREN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 355 (1967). Eisenhower re-
ferred to Brennan as "my second Supreme Court mistake." J. POLLACK, EARL WARREN - THE
JUDGE WHO JUDGED AMERICA 194 (1979). (Earl Warren was his first. Id.).
205. B. SCHWARTZ & S. LESHER, supra note 101, at 102.
206. J. POLLACK, supra note 204, at 194. See also L. KATCHER, supra note 204, at 355
(explaining that Eisenhower wanted to appoint a Democrat to attract Democratic and indepen-
dent votes).
207. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 101, at 204-06. For an in-depth recent assessment of
Brennan as the "glue of the liberal majority" of the Warren Court, see Heck, Justice Brennan and
the Heyday of Warren Court Liberalism, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 841 (1980). (The quote is from
Totenberg, Conflict at the Court, in READINGS IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 75/76, 162 (1975)). See
also Heck, The Socialization of a Freshman Justice: The Early Years of Justice Brennan, 10 PAC.
L.J. 707 (1979); Galloway, The Early Years of the Warren Court: Emergence of Judicial Liberalism
(1953-1957), 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 609 (1978).
208. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 101, at 165, 198-205, 208. The four activists were Warren,
Black, Douglas and Brennan. For a discussion of the importance of the bond between Warren and
Brennan, see id. at 127.
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Brennan explicitly articulated his rationale for judicial activism in
1965, noting "the American habit, extraordinary to other democracies,
of casting social, economic, philosophical and political questions" in
the form of lawsuits. "In this way," he continued, "important aspects
of the most fundamental issues confronting our democracy end up ulti-
mately in the Supreme Court for judicial determination." 2 9 In
Brennan's view, the most important issue facing the Supreme Court
during his tenure has been the defense of individual rights against gov-
ernmental intrusion. Brennan noted in 1965:
Over the past 30 years... the chief subject of the cases coming
to the Court has concerned the relationship of the individual
to the Government-State and Federal-that is, with the in-
terpretation and application of the limitations upon govern-
mental power embodied primarily in the Bill of Rights.2"'
Brennan has consistently advocated innovative constitutional
remedies for individual rights violations during his tenure on the
Supreme Court.211 When he joined the Court, a major source of con-
troversy between Justice Frankfurter and the activists was the question
of whether the Bill of Rights could be applied to the states through the
fourteenth amendment, the so-called "incorporation" controversy.
Brennan (in opposition to Frankfurter) supported the notion that sub-
stantial portions of the Bill of Rights had been "incorporated" into the
fourteenth amendment, a position that broadened the scope for indi-
209. W. Brennan, The Role of The Court - The Challenge for the Future (lecture deliv-
ered Mar. 19, 1965), reprinted in AN AFFAIR wiTH FREEDOM 316 (S. Friedman ed. 1967). Brennan's
judicial activism also stems from legal realism. In the same speech, he decried classical legal
thought's claim that law was autonomous from politics.
None of us in the ministry of the law.., can deny that Law has sometimes given cause for
complaint, that Law has isolated itself from the boiling and difficult currents of life as life
is lived. This was not so before the 19th century .... However, [during that period] the
vogue of isolating law from the other disciplines. .. [produced] a notion of law wholly
unconcerned with the broader extra-legal values pursued by society at large or by the
individual.
Id. at 320.
Brennan's message was that law inevitably involves political choices; hence the importance
of an activist approach designed to forward desirable political goals.
210. W. Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States (lecture delivered Feb. 15, 1961),
reprinted in AN AFFAIR WITH Fmt aoOM, supra note 209, at 316.
211. Brennan's appointment in 1956 brought him to Washington at the peak of the Mc-
Carthy era. (In fact, because Brennan had spoken out against McCarthy, McCarthy voted against
Brennan's appointment to the Supreme Court-he was the only senator to do so.) S. Friedman,
supra note 209, at 10.
America's cold war paranoia brought to the Supreme Court a long string of cases in which
plaintiffs with real or imagined links to the Communist party claimed violations of their constitu-
tional rights of free speech and against self-incrimination. See W.T. MITAU, supra note 101, at I I-
48. As a consequence, many of the fundamental issues before the Supreme Court in the early years
of Brennan's tenure involved the Bill of Rights.
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vidual rights suits against the states.21 2 Brennan also played a central
role in the famous Warren Court cases that mobilized the equal protec-
tion clause to address issues such as school desegregation 21 3 and reap-
portionment 2 14 during the 1960's. His commitment to providing inno-
vative constitutional remedies continued in the late sixties and
seventies, when he played an important role in extending the reach of
both the equal protection and due process clauses. He applied the four-
teenth amendment in novel contexts, and helped develop the theory
that the Court should strictly scrutinize government actions that bur-
den "fundamental interests." 21 5
212. Heck, supra note 207, at 847-50 ("Brennan's mark is perhaps most apparent in the
cases incorporating provisions of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment.").
Frankfurter, who had taught Brennan at Harvard, probably assumed at first that Brennan
would vote with the conservative bloc. B. SCHWARTZ & S. LESHER, supra note 101, at 127. But
Frankfurter soon became disillusioned: "I always encouraged my students to think for them-
selves," Frankfurter is supposed to have said, "but Brennan goes too far." B. SCHWARTZ, supra
note 101, at 205.
213. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was decided before Brennan
joined the Court, but Brennan played an active role in the subsequent cases implementing Brown.
See Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 663 n.5 (Brennan's list of twenty-three cases involving school boards);
W.T. MITAU, supra note 101, at 60-78 (description of early compliance problems).
Brennan played a central role in the Little Rock desegregation case, in part because he felt
strongly about the issue, in part because Chief Justice Warren tended to assign him to crucial cases
due to his faith in Brennan's ability to gain votes for the activist position. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra
note 101, at 289-305; B. SCHWARTZ & S. LESHER, supra note 101 at 128.
214. Not only did Brennan write Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), he played a major
role in persuading other members of the Court to vote in favor of the activist position. See
B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 101, at 189, 193-94. (For a recent discussion of Brennan's mastery of
drafting opinions designed to garner Court majorities, see Tushnet, Book Review, The Optimist's
Tale, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1257, 1262-65 (1984)).
215. Justice Douglas articulated the theory that strict scrutiny was triggered when the
state threatened or deprived an individual of certain "fundamental interests" in Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (striking down law requiring compulsory sterilizations for moral
turpitude). In Skinner, Douglas' holding was based in part on equal protection and in part on the
fundamental interests theory. Brennan preserved this ambiguity in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969), which struck down a welfare residency requirement, based in part on the constitutional
right to travel, in part on the fundamental interests theory, i.e. that the case involved deprivation
of "food, shelter, and other necessities of life," 394 U.S. at 627.
Ultimately, the theory that cases involving fundamental rights should involve strict scrutiny
review was rejected by the Burger Court. The Court did not overrule cases that applied the funda-
mental rights analysis; instead, it refused to characterize interests as "fundamental." See, e.g., San
Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 37 (1973) (fact that some children received a better
education than others did not amount to deprivation of a fundamental right). The "fundamental
interests" theory was firmly put to rest by Justice Powell in Garcia v. San Antonio, 105 S.Ct. 1005
(1985).
For a discussion of Brennan's role in Shapiro v. Thompson and Warren's dissent, see
B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 101, at 725-32.
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B. Justice Brennan's Municipal Liability Decisions
Brennan apparently views his decisions holding that plaintiffs can
sue municipalities under 42 U.S.C. section 1983216 as the logical mod-
ern extension of his thirty-year commitment to the defense of individual
rights. Much of the recent civil rights litigation has been brought under
section 1983,217 and extension of section 1983 liability is to the 1980's
what the incorporation controversy was to the 1960's. Moreover, as
will be shown below, Brennan's opinions advocating increased antitrust
liability for municipalities, 2 8 as well as his famous dissent in San Diego
Gas & Electric v. San Diego21 9 advocating an inverse condemnation
remedy in zoning cases, are also linked to his goal of allowing plaintiffs
broad remedies for violations of individual rights. What urbanists have
considered Brennan's nigh-monomaniacal insistence on broad city lia-
bility 22 1 stems from his desire to control federalism principles devel-
216. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1983).
217. Since Monroe v. Pape, the number of § 1983 and civil rights suits brought in the
federal courts has increased from 236 in 1961 to 12,944 in 1980. Comment, Federalism, Section
1983 and State Law Remedies: Curtailing the Federal Civil Rights Docket by Restricting the Under-
lying Right, 43 U. PiTT. L. REv. 1035, 1038-46 (1982). See also Lansford, Municipal Liability Under
the Klu Klux Klan Act of 1871-An Historical Perspective, in SECTION 1983: SWORD AND SHIELD 23-
42 (R. Freilich & R. Carlisle eds. 1983) [hereinafter cited as SWORD AND SHIELD].
218. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. 389 (1978); City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); Fisher v.
City of Berkeley, 106 S.Ct. 1045 (1986).
219. San Diego Gas & Elec. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 636-61 (1981) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
220. For an example of urbanists' alarm at Brennan inverse condemnation opinions, see
Williams, Smith, Siemon, Mandelker, & Babcock, The White River Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L.
REv. 193, 236-40 (1984) (top land use lawyers assert "We are appalled at the marvel we are wit-
nessing .... Before the seductive simplicity of [Brennan's inverse condemnation theory] ... spreads
the infection further afield, we think that it is time, if not past time, to declare that Justice
Brennan's dissent is wrong as a matter of constitutional analysis and misguided as a matter of
judicial policy.") Id. at 193-94; Freilich, Solving the "Taking" Equation: Making the Whole Equal
the Sum of its Parts, in SWORD AND SHIELD, supra note 217, at 211; Bozung, Judicially Created
Zoning With Compensation: California's Brief Experiment With Inverse Condemnation, 10 ENVTL.
L. 67 (1979); Note, Inverse Condemnation: Its Availability in Challenging the Validity of a Zoning
Ordinance, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1439 (1974); Gelfand, Comparative Urban Finance: Are the London
and Brooklyn Bridges Falling Down? 55 TUL. L. REV. 651 (1981); Comment, Civil Rights for the
Propertied Class: The Development of Inverse Condemnation in the Federal Courts, 55 TUL. L. REv.
897, 929-30 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Civil Rights for the Propertied Class]. But cf. Bauman, The
Supreme Court, Inverse Condemnation and the Fifth Amendment: Justice Brennan Confronts the
Inevitable in Land Use Controls, 15 RUTGERS L. REV. 15 (1983) (lawyer for the National Associa-
tion of Home Builders speaks out in support of Brennan's position).
The Urban Lawyer has led the attack on Brennan's antitrust and § 1983 opinions. Concern-
ing antitrust opinions, see, e.g., Freilich, Frye & Carpenter, The New Federalism-American Urban
Policy in the 1980s: Trends and Directions in Urban, State, and Local Government Law, 15 URB.
1986:83
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oped by Justice Rehnquist, which restrict civil rights plaintiffs' ability to
recover in federal courts.221
1. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 1983
An understanding of Justice Brennan's role in extending section
1983 liability to municipalities must begin with a closer look at the
school desegregation cases of the 1960's and 1970's. The seminal case of
Brown v. Board of Education,2 22 decided two years before Justice
Brennan was appointed to the Supreme Court, held that segregated
school systems violated the fourteenth amendment's guarantees of
equal protection. Brown precipitated a plethora of litigation against
school boards, much of it under section 1983.223 By the mid-1970's, the
school desegregation cases had come to represent an unsettling contra-
diction to some members of the Supreme Court, including Justice
Brennan.
In 1961, the Supreme Court had held in Monroe v. Pape2 24 that
municipalities were not "persons" and so could not be sued under sec-
tion 1983.225 This holding raised serious questions about the doctrinal
status of section 1983 lawsuits against school boards, which were a type
of "municipality." As of 1977, these questions remained unanswered,
but certain members of the Court decided that the time had come to
LAW. 159, 215 (1983) (calling City of Boulder "a striking blow to municipalities..."); Melton, The
State Action Antitrust Defense for Local Governments: A State Authorization Approach, 12 URB.
LAW. 315, 375 (1980) (written before City of Boulder, advising Supreme Court to proceed cau-
tiously to avoid extraordinary intrusion into the operation of state and local government). See also
Comment, Antitrust and Zoning: How Much Respect for Local Government?, 22 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 901, 996 (1982) (concluding: very little) [hereinafter cited as How Much Respect]; Comment,
Municipalities' Increased Susceptibility to Antitrust Liability: Community Communications Co. v.
City of Boulder, 24 B.C.L. REv. 1399 (1983); Witt, Antitrust Law and the Boulder Case: New Threat
to the Planning and Zoning Process, 1983 INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 74.
For a discussion of § 1983 opinions, see Freilich, supra at 211, 222. At times, urbanists'
attacks appear directly aligned with conservatives' general attack on Section 1983. See, e.g., Man-
ley, Inverse Condemnation Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, in SWORD AND SHIELD, supra note 217, at
251 ("The extent to which Americans clamor to place federal courts in charge of every aspect of
friction in society under the guise of civil rights litigation is appalling"). See also Williamson,
Judicial Activism: Section 1983 and Antitrust Liability Chill Decision Making by State and Local
Oficials, 6 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL. 149 (1983). For good balanced discussions of the impact of§
1983 municipal liability, see Jaron, The Threat of Personal Liability under the Federal Civil Rights
Act: Does it Interfere with the Performance of State and Local Government?, in SWORD AND SHIELD,
supra note 217, at 309; Kushnir, The Impact of Section 1983 after Monell on Municipal Policy
Formulation and Implementation, in SWORD AND SHIELD, supra note 217, at 419.
221. See infra notes 235-44 and accompanying text.
222. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
223. For a discussion of early cases, see W.T. MITAU, supra note 101, at 51-79.
224. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
225. Monroe held that although municipalities could not be sued in their own names,
municipal officials could be sued in their official capacities. Monell left the latter holding intact, 436
U.S. at 663 n.7.
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answer them. The result was Monell v. New York City Department of
Social Services,"2 6 a case involving a constitutional challenge by female
New York City teachers to the Board of Education's policy requiring
pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves
were medically necessary. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the
issue of whether cities and school boards were "persons" under section
1983, and held they were.227
A major factor in the Monell decision was the Court's desire to
retain federal constitutional jurisdiction in section 1983 cases involving
school boards. Although Justice Brennan's treatment of the issue in the
majority opinion was laconic, 22 1 Justice Powell's concurring opinion
provided a fuller discussion. 229 After describing Monroe v. Pape and a
line of cases associated with it, Powell continued:
This line of cases ... is difficult to reconcile on a principled
basis with a parallel series of cases in which the Court had
assumed sub silencio that some local government entities
could be sued under section 1983 .... If we continue to adhere
to Monroe, grave doubts would be cast upon the Court's exer-
cise of section 1983 jurisdiction over school boards.23 °
Brennan's concern to save the school board desegregation cases
explains his decision in Monell, but it does not explain his holding two
226. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
227. Id. at 662-63.
228. Id. at 663-64. Brennan did not discuss the contradiction between Monroe v. Pape and
the school board cases directly. Yet his opinion did cite a case (decided the previous term) in which
the contradiction had been noted. Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Boyle, 429 U.S. 274, 279
(1977). Moreover, after overruling Monroe v. Pape, Brennan cited twenty-three cases in which
school boards were defendants in § 1983 suits. Monell v. New York, 436 U.S. 658, 663 n.5 (1978).
229. Powell appears to have had a second motivation for his position in Monell. Before
Monell, Monroe v. Pape forbid all § 1983 suits against cities. As a consequence, some courts al-
lowed plaintiffs to sue for constitutional violations directly under the Constitution, by means of
so-called Bivens actions. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (viola-
tion of fourth amendment by a federal agent gives rise to a federal cause of action in damages);
Note, Damages Remedies Against Municipalities for Constitutional Violations, 89 HARV. L. REV.
922 (1976) (describing Bivens suits against cities).
The language of Powell's Monell opinion indicates that his concurrence was motivated in
part by his desire to eliminate Bivens actions against cities. 429 U.S. at 710. In fact, few courts have
upheld Bivens suits against cities since Monell.
230. 436 U.S. at 710-11. Powell seemed to imply that the conflict between Monroe and the
school board cases was tolerable so long as the Supreme Court ignored it, but once it had directly
reconsidered Monroe v. Pape it had no choice but to overrule the case if the school board cases
were to be saved.
Few commentators have noted that the Court in Monell adopted a compromise position.
Monell held that cities were liable if constitutional violations resulted from official policy, but not
on a respondeat superior theory. A brief in support of the plaintiffs had argued that cities should
be liable not only for official policies that proved unconstitutional, but also by respondeat supe-
rior. See Amicus Curiae Brief of National Education Association and Lawyers' Committee for
Civil Rights Under Law, at 24.
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years later in Owen v. City of Independence.23 1 Owen involved a proce-
dural due process violation in the firing of a city employee. The Court
held that the city had no immunity under section 1983 despite the fact
that, at the time the employee was fired, the Supreme Court case requir-
ing a pretermination hearing had not yet been handed down.
2 3 2
Brennan's holding in Owen that municipalities have no good faith
immunity in section 1983 suits was profoundly disturbing to urbanists,
who feared massive damage judgments for actions that did not appear
unconstitutional to municipal officers when they were undertaken.233
Brennan saw Owen as part of his on-going battle with Justice Rehnquist
over the scope of citizens' ability to recover for violations of their con-
stitutional rights by governments and their officials. This controversy
involves three separate issues: the scope of section 1983, the eleventh
amendment immunity, and immunity of officials sued in their individ-
ual capacities.2 3 Only the first two of these issues are relevant here.
The section 1983 issue is whether governmental units (states and cities)
are "persons" under section 1983. The eleventh amendment issue is
whether states are immune from damage suits in the federal courts
(even in the event that such suits are theoretically allowed under section
1983).
The first round of the struggle over governmental immunity came
in 1974 in Edelman v. Jordan,2 3 5 in which Justice Rehnquist held that
the eleventh amendment barred awards of retrospective damages from
state treasuries in federal courts.2 3 6 Justice Brennan dissented in
Edelman, asserting that the eleventh amendment did not bar damage
231. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
232. Id. at 630 n.10.
233. See supra note 220. Justice Brennan's citations in Monell dramatize how differently
he views civil rights suits against cities than do urbanists. Urbanists may envision a typical § 1983
suit as a developer's suit claiming that the value of his land has been destroyed by restrictive
zoning; Brennan evidently envisions the typical § 1983 suit as involving a beating administered to
an innocent citizen by Sheriff Screws. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (lawsuit under §
242, the predecessor of§ 1983). Citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (the case involving
the killing of four students by Ohio national guardsmen), Brennan noted in Monell that "owing to
the qualified immunity enjoyed by most governmental officials, many victims of municipal malfea-
sance would be left remediless if the city were allowed to assert a good-faith defense."
234. The immunity of state and local officials from damages is beyond the scope of this
Article. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (195 1) (immunity of legislators); Wood v. Strick-
land, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judicial immunity). States'
eleventh amendment immunity is addressed in Edelman v. Jordan, infra note 235 and Quern v.
Jordan infra note 239.
Monroe v. Pape, Monell and dicta in Quern address the issue of whether government entities
are "persons" under § 1983.
235. 415 U.S. 651, 663-65 (1974).
236. Id. at 677. The Court held in 1945 that the eleventh amendment bars suits for money
damages against a state, Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't. of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 462 (1945), unless
the state consents to be sued. In Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), the Warren Court
held that a state's consent need not be explicit. The Edelman court narrowed Parden by showing
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awards against states by their own citizens in any circumstances. 2 37 Jus-
tice Marshall did not adopt Brennan's views, but argued (in part) that
no official immunity existed in the specific circumstances involved in
Edelman. Marshall's argument began from the accepted premise that
Congress may abolish eleventh amendment immunity whenever it
wishes to do so. Marshall argued that Congress had indicated its desire
to abolish immunity whenever a section 1983 suit was involved.238
Not until 1979, in Quern v. Jordan, did Justice Rehnquist write a
majority opinion rejecting Marshall's argument that section 1983
"pierced" states' eleventh amendment immunity.2 39 During the period
from 1974 to 1979, Brennan and Rehnquist carried on a running battle
over the scope of governmental immunity to damage suits.
In a 1976 opinion, Rehnquist introduced in dicta an argument of
crucial importance for our purposes.24 ° He bolstered his claim that
states were not "persons" under section 1983 by arguing that, since
Monroe v. Pape established that cities were immune from section 1983
suits, states were a fortiorari immune as well. 24 a Two years later, in
Monell, Brennan and the majority overruled Monroe v. Pape and held
that cities were liable under section 1983 where city policy contravened
the constitution. Immediately after Monell, Brennan began to argue
that Monell undercut the premise that states were not "persons" under
section 1983. He argued that states' exclusion was premised on that of
cities. Therefore, since Monell made cities "persons" under section
1983, states should also fall within that designation.242
In Quern v. Jordan, Rehnquist held both that (Monell notwith-
standing) states were not persons under section 1983, and that states'
eleventh amendment immunity was not overridden by section 1983.243
Brennan, outraged, responded that the holding concerning the scope of
that the Burger Court would at times require fairly explicit indications of a state's intention to
consent to a suit.
237. 415 U.S. at 687 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan's position was that the eleventh
amendment applied only when a state was sued by citizens of a different state.
238. Id. at 688 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall's argument was that, although elev-
enth amendment immunity existed in some contexts, Congress could override it if it showed the
requisite intent to do so. Section 1983, according to Marshall, showed that Congress intended to
override eleventh amendment immunity in all contexts involving deprivation of plaintiffs' federal
rights under § 1983. While Marshall's argument did leave some cases where eleventh amendment
immunity was appropriate, his argument would have eliminated immunity in a broad band of civil
rights cases and federal statutes.
239. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
240. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
241. Id. at 452.
242. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 703 (1978) (Brennan's concurring opinion asserts that
the Court's opinions in Monell and Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer had rendered "the essential premise of our
Edelman holding .. . no longer true"); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. at 350-51 ("The premise of
[Edelman's] reasoning was undercut last term" in Monell).
243. 440 U.S. at 338-40.
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section 1983 was merely dicta.244 Thus, when Owen was being decided
in the following year, Brennan considered the scope of states' section
1983 liability to be an open question for the court. Brennan's holdings
in Monell and Owen served to expand cities' potential liability in section
1983 suits, and to leave the way open for a possible holding that both
states and cities were persons under section 1983, and moreover en-
joyed no elements of governmental immunity.
In summary, from Brennan's standpoint, Monell and Owen repre-
sent merely the most recent skirmish in his long-standing battle with
Justice Rehnquist to ensure that the Constitution offers effective reme-
dies to plaintiffs deprived of individual rights by governmental action.
2. JUSTICE BRENNAN AND MUNICIPAL ANTITRUST IMMUNITY
In Monell and Owen, Justice Brennan persuaded the Court to
adopt his position that municipalities should not extend official immu-
nity to section 1983 suits against cities. Brennan has had more difficulty
in persuading the Court to impose liability on cities under the antitrust
laws and inverse condemnation doctrine. In both these areas, Brennan
has gone further, faster than the majority of the Court has been willing
to follow.
The first major case involving municipal antitrust liability was City
of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light.2 4 5 City of Lafayette reversed a
thirty-five-year-old assumption that cities were immune from antitrust
liability. Prior to City of Lafayette, courts had assumed that cities as
well as states were exempt from the antitrust laws under the "state ac-
tion" exemption established by Parker v. Brown,24 6 a 1943 case that
held that Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to apply to states.
The Lafayette court was badly split. Brennan wrote the majority opin-
ion, but he received a majority of votes only for his holding that cities
were not automatically immune from the antitrust laws. Brennan went
on to suggest that a city would be immune only if its action was "autho-
rized or directed" by the state. But Brennan could not garner a majority
for this position, so the question of when a city could qualify for "state
action" immunity under Parker v. Brown was left unanswered.247
The most pressing question after City of Lafayette was whether
home rule cities were automatically immune from antitrust liability.
244. Id. at 351 (Rehnquist's assertion is dicta); 440 U.S. at 350 ("It is deeply disturbing...
that the Court should engage in today's gratuitous departure from customary judicial practice and
reach out to decide an issue unnecessary to its holding").
245. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
246. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
247. 435 U.S. at 414. "State action" antitrust immunity should not be confused with the
"state action" doctrine under the fourteenth amendment. The two are totally unrelated.
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Home rule cities have sovereignty over local affairs either by statute or
by constitutional provision (both designed to overrule Dillon's Rule
and its accompanying doctrines).24 After City of Lafayette, many city
attorneys assumed that the actions of home rule cities would qualify
automatically for "state action" immunity, because under most home
rule provisions states expressly delegate authority over local affairs to
cities."' Thus, when a cable television company sued Boulder, Colo-
rado, claiming that a city-ordered moratorium on expansions of cable
television service was a restraint on trade, Boulder's attorneys argued
that the city was immune from antitrust liability because Colorado's
home rule provision meant that Boulder was acting as the state in its
handling of city affairs. The Supreme Court in City of Boulder v. Com-
munity Communications disagreed.2 5 ° Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority, asserted that Colorado's home rule provision showed only
that the state was neutral, not that it had authorized regulation of cable
television.2 1
Justice Brennan was insistent in both City of Lafayette and City of
Boulder that his opinions did not signal a return to the city subjection of
the late nineteenth century. During that period, Dillon's Rule meant
that cities had to be able to point to a specific statute granting explicit
authority to undertake a proposed activity.252 Brennan denied that the
Court's antitrust decisions would recreate this situation, and asserted
that City of Boulder "does not mean ... that a political subdivision
necessarily must be able to point to a specific, detailed legislative autho-
rization" before it may properly assert that its action was taken as
"state action" (and therefore is immune).253 Municipal attorneys dis-
agreed with Brennan's assessment. The city's attorney said after the
Boulder decision:
The political impact may be the biggest ultimately because the
Court did not hold that cities cannot be immune; it simply
held that they didn't have any independent dignity under our
federal system. And therefore they had to go running back to
the state legislature, literally, to get their ticket punched for
each new activity which was subject to challenge. That kind of
248. See supra notes 42, 200.
249. Home rule statutes that do not delegate authority over local affairs normally dele-
gate to cities even broader authority to undertake actions not in conflict with state law. See supra
note 200.
250. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
251. Id. at 55-56.
252. See, e.g., Lafayette v. Cox, 5 Ind. 38 (1854); Willard v. Killingworth, 8 Conn. 247
(1830); S.P. Clark v. Davenport, 14 Iowa 496 (1863); Kyle v. Malin, 8 Ind. 34 (1856); Richmond v.
McGirr, 78 Ind. 192 (1881); Kansas v. Swope, 79 Mo. 446 (1883); Spengler v. Trowbridge, 62
Miss. 46 (1884); Charleston v. Reed, 27 W. Va. 681 (1886); Portland v. Schmidt, 13 Or. 17 (1887).
253. 435 U.S. at 415.
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an operation-a reorienting of our political power-seriously
undermines the whole home rule movement, which is based
on the principle that local people at the grass roots could de-
cide their own police power objectives and local policy.2" 4
Not only has the impact of Brennan's decisions arguably been to
reinstitute Dillon's regime; 255 Brennan also revitalized Dillon's lan-
guage of city subjection, which had been quiescent in recent municipal
law. Brennan's antitrust opinions stressed America's "dual system of
government": 2 11 "We are a nation not of 'city states'," he reminded the
Court, "but of States ... ,,257 Brennan also stated that "Cities are not
themselves sovereign; they do not receive all the federal deference of the
States that create them." 258
Though Brennan felt self-conscious about using Dillon's rhetoric
of city subjection, 25 9 he did so nonetheless because this rhetorical strat-
egy allowed him to turn a liability into an asset. The traditional city-as-
creature-of-the-state analysis presented problems for Brennan: for if
cities were merely subdivisions of states, why then were cities not im-
254. Jeffrey Howard, attorney for the city in City of Boulder. MacNeil-Lehrer Report
(May 25, 1982) (transcript available from National Public Television).
255. A close examination of the municipal antitrust cases so far decided suggests that
federal courts have given cities a much broader rein under the antitrust laws than late 19th century
state courts did under Dillon's Rule. This trend is confirmed by Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire, 105 S.Ct. 1713 (1985), which sets up a test for state action that municipalities should not in
many instances find difficult to meet. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S.Ct. 1713
(1985) (town actions qualify as "state action" immune to antitrust requirements when town activ-
ity is authorized by state law; rejecting alternative test requiring town activity to be actively super-
vised by state in order to qualify as state action).
In cases in which courts perceive some wrongdoing, however, they have felt free to find that
municipal action was not properly authorized by state law, and so have imposed antitrust liability.
See, e.g., Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 519 F. Supp. 991 (S.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd, 700
F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1983) (verdict reinstated), modifieden banc, 735 F. 2d 1555 (5th Cir. 1984) (treble
damages imposed on Houston for antitrust violations). Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, No. 81-
C-274546 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. 598 (BNA) (N.D. Ill. filed 1981) (treble damages imposed
on the Village of Grayslake and the County of Lake (Illinois) for antitrust violations); Vickery
Manor Serv. Corp. v. Village of Mundelein, 575 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. 11. 1983) (city not immune
from antitrust liability unless action was either expressly authorized by state statute or was a rea-
sonable or foreseeable use of expressly granted powers). For a comprehensive review of antitrust
challenges to land use regulation, see Deutsch, Antitrust Challenges to Local Zoning and Other
Land Use Controls, 60 C.[-]KENT L. REV. 63 (1984). It remains to be seen whether courts will now
be less reluctant to find cities liable for antitrust violations because of the statute passed recently
precluding municipal liability for treble damages, Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750 (1984). Now that the threat of treble damages has been eliminated,
federal courts may well become more active in overseeing city behavior (via antitrust suits) in a
way similar to the way state courts oversaw city behavior (via Dillon's Rule) in the late 19th
century.
256. 455 U.S. at 53 (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. at 351).
257. Id. at 54 (quoting a dissenting Court of Appeals opinion, 630 F.2d at 717).
258. Id. at 50 (quoting City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412-13).
259. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
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mune from antitrust liability (as were states) under Parker v. Brown's
"state action" doctrine?
Brennan dodged this problem by separating two aspects of Dil-
lon's formulation that traditionally have been linked: the principle that
cities have no inherent sovereignty, and the doctrine that cities are sub-
divisions of the state. Boulder's attorney had combined these two doc-
trines in the traditional way, arguing that the city enjoyed the state's
immunity because it was merely an agent of state power. 260 Brennan
responded that the city was not automatically entitled to state action
immunity precisely because it was a creature of the state with no inde-
pendent sovereignty, and so was not entitled to the same protection the
state received. 26 '
The source of Brennan's fervor for municipal antitrust liability is
suggested by the case he cites for the principle that ours is a dual system
of government: Edelman v. Jordan.2 6 2 This cite provides the key to un-
derstanding why Monell and the municipal antitrust cases were inextri-
cably linked in Brennan's mind. Monell and City of Lafayette were de-
cided virtually simultaneously, 263 and involved some parallel doctrinal
issues. In both, Brennan argued that cities should not enjoy immunity
despite the fact that states were immune. Brennan also stressed in both
opinions that cities (unlike states) were "persons" under the statutes
involved.2 64 Brennan's subtext: that even if the federalism concerns en-
260. 455 U.S. at 52-53.
261. Id. at 53-54. Brennan's attempts to adhere to Dillon's traditional tenets and yet to
distance the city from the state make City of Boulder a deconstructionist's dream: the decision
degenerates into incoherence under only mildly rigorous analysis. One contradiction is noted in
the text: ifa state has delegated all its authority to a home rule city so that the city exercises all state
powers with respect to city affairs, why isn't the city immune under Parker v. Brown? A second
internal contradiction in Brennan's analysis is that, while he assumes the city is a governmental
entity, he also refers to the city as "corporate," apparently implying that cities are not immune
from the antitrust laws because they are more like private corporations than like public entities.
See Development of the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 34 (detailing long history of the
confusion over whether the city is public or private).
262. 435 U.S. at 412. Brennan's cite was to a footnote in Rehnquist's opinion distinguish-
ing between counties and states for eleventh amendment purposes. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at
667 n.12 (distinguishing Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890)).
263. Monell was argued on November 2, 1977 and decided on June 6, 1978; City of Lafay-
ette was argued on October 4, 1977 and decided on March 27, 1978.
264. Monell, 436 U.S. at 662, 690-91; City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 394-97. In Monell,
Brennan relied on legislative history to support this conclusion; in City of Boulder, he relied on
Dillon's rhetoric of city subjection in stressing that cities were dramatically different from states
because of their lack of inherent sovereignty.
Of course, the Court could have held that cities were "persons" under the antitrust laws and
not under § 1983 or vice versa. Nonetheless, it is not difficult to see how a holding that cities were
not persons under the antitrust laws would have seemed to Brennan to threaten a similar holding
under § 1983.,
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capsulated in Edelman are relevant in suits against states, they are irrel-
evant in suits against cities or other local government units.265
Brennan's insistent rhetoric of city subjection can best be viewed as
part of a successful attempt to control what Brennan views as the dam-
age done by Edelman.266 Rehnquist may have won his attempt to pre-
clude damage remedies for violation of individual rights against states,
the municipal liability cases say, but Brennan has tried to ensure that
the 62,500 local government units 267 will not receive the same
immunity.268
265. For this reason Brennan was persistent in attempting to incorporate the rhetoric of
city subjection into a majority opinion. He originally wrote the "dual system of government"
language into his plurality opinion in City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412, and then incorporated it
into his majority opinion in City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 53.
266. The analysis presented by no means implies that Justice Brennan is indifferent to the
antitrust consequences of his municipal antitrust opinions. He has, in fact, a long history of sup-
port for the antitrust laws. See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957); United States v.
Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. United States, 386
U.S. 372 (1967). In all three of these decisions Brennan argued for broad application of the anti-
trust laws. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 101, at 222-24, 475-79, 671-72. See also W. DOUGLAS,
AUTOBIOGRAPHY - THE COURT YEARS 163 (1980). My only contention is that both in the antitrust
municipal liability cases and the inverse condemnation cases, Brennan's fervor is attributable to
his concerns about how Rehnquist's Edelman doctrine will affect plaintiffs' ability to recover dam-
ages for violation of individual rights, a topic he clearly feels more deeply about than either anti-
trust or zoning.
267. This is Justice Brennan's figure. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. 389, 407 (1981). A
more recent estimate is 79,862. See I UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1977 CENSUS OF
GOVERNMENTS 1.
268. In Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 106 S.Ct. 1045 (1986), decided as this Article was in the
final stages of publication, Brennan received a setback to his attempt to expand municipal anti-
trust liability. The case involved a challenge to Berkeley's rent control ordinance on the grounds
that it constituted a conspiracy to monopolize in violation of section I of the Sherman Antitrust
Act. Justice Marshall's majority opinion never reached the issue of whether Berkeley's rent control
ordinance was exempt "state action" under Parker v. Brown. Instead, the Court held that no
antitrust violation existed because no conspiracy existed in Berkeley between the local government
and the landlords. The Court analogized Berkeley's action to a restraint imposed by a single firm,
which would not violate the antitrust laws even if it had the same economic effect as a conspiracy
would have had.
Brennan was the sole and vigorous dissenter. He disagreed, first, with the majority's basic
antitrust analysis, claiming that past precedent such as California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980), did not require proof of concerted action for a finding
of preemption. Brennan claimed, second, that even if concerted action was required, a "functional
combination" existed between Berkeley and the landlords. Finally, he said that the Berkeley ordi-
nance was not exempt "state action," since (according to Brennan) it was not passed pursuant to
clearly articulated state policy. Brennan, therefore, would have held Berkeley liable for conspiracy
to monopolize.
Although Brennan's opinion claims that the majority's holding "excludes a broad range of
local government anticompetitive activities from the reach of the antitrust laws," 106 S.Ct. at
1051, in fact the Berkeley holding appears inapplicable in cases in which local governments them-
selves are engaged in monopolistic activities, such as in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105
S.Ct. 1713 (1985) (municipality required adjacent areas to be annexed in order to receive trash
treatment service, arguably an attempt to monopolize), or City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982) (city
arguably created monopoly with respect to cable television service.) In cases such as Town of Hallie
and City of Boulder, where a claim can be sustained that the locality itself is attempting to monop-
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3. JUSTICE BRENNAN AND INVERSE CONDEMNATION: "AFTER ALL, IF A
POLICEMAN MUST KNOW THE CONSTITUTION, WHY NOT A PLANNER?"
2 6 9
The Brennan opinions most incomprehensible to urbanists and
city planners are his opinions advocating a damages remedy in cases in
which a court invalidates local zoning as a regulatory "taking." ' 27 o Tra-
ditionally, the only remedy available to a landowner in this context was
invalidation of the unconstitutional portion of the zoning ordi-
nance.271 Recently, landowners have begun to ask not only for invali-
dation, but also for "interim" damages to reimburse them for the per-
iod during which the unconstitutional zoning was in effect.272
Since 1980, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in three cases
involving the issue of whether a damages remedy is constitutionally re-
quired when a zoning regulation goes too far. To the amusement and
relief of planning lawyers, the Supreme Court has failed each time to
reach the merits, 27 3 arguing in each opinion that the case did not prop-
erly present the inverse condemnation issue.274 Planners' amusement at
the Supreme Court's hurry up and wait approach is matched only by
their dumbfounded disbelief at Brennan's role in the inverse condemna-
tion controversy. 2 1 As in the municipal antitrust cases, Brennan has
gone further in advocating liability in the inverse condemnation cases
than the majority of the Court has been willing to follow. In fact, in the
inverse condemnation context, Brennan's position has never been
olize, no conspiracy need be proven, since the Sherman Act prohibits attempts to monopolize as
well as conspiracies to do so. (In Berkeley, allegations of conspiracy were vital because no claim
was made that the city itself was attempting to monopolize the housing market).
269. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621,636 (1981) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
270. See supra note 220.
271. See F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES, J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 238-55 (1973); Pamel
Corp. v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 621 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1980) (remedy awarded in regulatory
takings cases ordinarily is restricted to injunctive or declarative relief); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24
Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Reptr. 372 (1979), af'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
272. See, e.g., Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (landowner sued for $2,000,000 in
interim damages); City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (landowner sued for $6,000,000 in in-
terim damages); Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S.Ct. 1352 (1985) (jury awarded land-
owner $350,000 in interim damages; landowner ultimately sold "overregulated" land at substan-
tial profit). See also cases cited in Civil Rights for the Propertied Class, supra note 220, at 909-13.
273. Agins, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 635 (1981); Hamilton Bank,
105 S.Ct. 1352 (1985). The Supreme Court recently heard oral argument in yet a fourth case in-
volving inverse condemnation in the context of zoning, MacDonald, Summer & Frates v. County
of Yolo and City of Davis, cert. granted, 88 L. Ed. 2d 253, 106 S.Ct. 244 (1985).
274. If one takes the Supreme Court at its word, one must conclude that the Court is
experiencing a regrettable lack of expertise in its decisions to award certiorari. Agins, 447 U.S. 255
(1980) (no taking had occurred); San Diego, 450 U.S. 635 (1981) (no final judgment on the issue of
whether a taking had occurred); Hamilton Bank, 105 S.Ct. 1352 (1985) (administrative actions of
zoning authorities not final; plaintiff should have applied for a variance and attempted to recover
damages under state statutory procedures).
275. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
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adopted by the full Court.2 ' 6 The authoritative statement of his posi-
tion remains his famous dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric v. City of
San Diego in 1981, in which Brennan insisted that landowners whose
property is "taken without due process by overregulation must be able
to recover damages."
2 7 7
"If a policeman must know the Constitution," Brennan asked in
San Diego, "why not a planner?" 278 Some zoning experts have inter-
preted this question as a sign of Brennan's ignorance. 279 They remind
Brennan that courts have never been able to articulate clear-cut tests
defining when regulation goes too far and becomes a taking. Therefore,
they argue, awarding damages to all affected landowners every time a
zoning restriction is struck down as overregulation would eviscerate
zoning, since localities with today's tight budgets would be forced to
abandon all rigorous zoning limitations for fear of financial ruin.280
Brennan's inverse condemnation opinions strike not only
urbanists but many other observers as exceedingly odd. For, in these
decisions, Brennan has emerged as the Burger Court's chief defender of
property owners chafing under stringent economic regulations. How
did Brennan, who graduated from law school during the Lochner
era, 28 1 and who throughout his career has been very deferential in re-
276. Although Brennan's position never has been adopted by the Court, his dissent did
receive four votes, and Justice Rehnquist indicated in a concurrence with the majority that he was
in basic agreement with Brennan's position.
277. 450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
278. 450 U.S. at 661 n.26.
279. See, e.g., Williams, Smith, supra note 220, at 197. A good place to assess Brennan's
understanding of takings law is his majority opinion in Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York, 438
U.S. 104 (1978). The opinion has a long discussion of prior takings cases, 438 U.S. at 122-35,
which graphically conveys to the informed reader Brennan's inability to formulate any focused
takings analysis. Brennan follows his discussion with a new takings test that is very much at odds
with the standard takings test in state zoning cases without appearing to recognize what he is
doing.
The standard state law "confiscation" test is that a zoning regulation is not a taking unless
the regulation destroys completely the value of the land regulated, because no feasible uses of the
regulated land would remain. See, e.g., Norbeck Village Joint Ventures v. Montgomery County
Council, 254 Md. 59, 259 A.2d. 700 (1969).
State courts generally require that a landowner must have some reasonable opportunity to
use his land, i.e., an opportunity that will bring a reasonable return. I N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN
LAND PLANNING LAW § 7.04a (1974 ed. & Supp. 1986) (noting that "there is a basic nationwide
rule" although "a few states provide exceptions to this").
In Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), Justice Brennan appeared to
endorse the reasonable return test in some passages, but in others he intimated that a taking occurs
whenever zoning or related restrictions interfere with a landowner's reasonable investment-backed
expectations. The latter formulation appears to guarantee to landowners some increment of land's
speculative value - a standard very different from that established by the reasonable use test
(particularly where state courts hold that a reasonable use exists unless every permitted use is
unfeasible).
280. Williams, Smith, supra note 220, at 236-40.
281. Brennan graduated from Harvard Law School in 1931. S. FRIEDMAN, supra note 209,
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viewing economic legislation,"' so abruptly lose his Lochner
inhibitions?
The answer is far from clear. Planning lawyers would rest easier if
they could convince Brennan that his inverse condemnation opinions
involve the kind of close Supreme Court scrutiny of regulatory legisla-
tion that the Court (with Brennan's enthusiastic concurrence) has
avoided since the famous Carolene Products footnote.28 3 If Brennan
were to accept this argument, he could draw a sharp distinction be-
tween the inverse condemnation cases and the cases he cares about
most-those involving damages remedies for civil rights plaintiffs. For
the present, however, Brennan remains unconvinced. He appears to be-
lieve that the only way to preserve a damages remedy for civil rights
plaintiffs under section 1983 is to advocate damages for landowners in
zoning contexts as well. The fact that landowners ordinarily append
section 1983 claims to their inverse condemnation suits presumably re-
inforces Brennan's belief that the inverse condemnation issue is closely
intertwined with the future of section 1983. Because Brennan sees the
issues as closely linked, he supports an inverse condemnation remedy,
since the last thing Brennan wants is precedent in which a plaintiff
whose constitutional rights have been violated is precluded from a dam-
ages remedy.284
III. COOLEY'S INHERENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT SOVEREIGNTY AS A
POLITICAL FORUM-SHIFTING ARGUMENT
A pattern has emerged: Dillon's formulation of city status and the
Burger Court majority's local sovereignty decisions both function as
political forum-shifting arguments, designed to rein in municipalities
and the federal government, respectively. Brennan's municipal liability
decisions stem from his desire to rein in government in order to protect
individual rights. Each of these formulations of city status thus func-
tions to contain that aspect of governmental power which, in the view
of its author, presents the greatest potential for abuse.
282. See Alternative to the Double Standard, supra note 104, at 58-73 (description of the
rise and development of the double standard). Brennan was part of the Warren Court activist
majority that brought the double standard to its current status. See supra note 208.
283. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). In the
Carolene Products footnote, Justice Stone made a now-classic statement of the distinction between
general regulatory legislation and government restrictions on fundamental constitutional values
such as individual rights. The Carolene Products footnote is widely cited for the principle that the
Court will not engage in strict scrutiny of economic legislation.
284. After all, Rehnquist's holding in Edelman was not that the plaintiffs were precluded
by the eleventh amendment from a remedy, but only that they were precluded from suing for
damages. Edelman left plaintiffs free to sue the state for injunctive relief. That is what Brennan's
disagreement with Rehnquist in Edelman is all about.
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This Section shows that Thomas M. Cooley's theory of local gov-
ernment sovereignty also functioned to limit governmental abuse
through a forum-shifting argument. Unlike Dillon, who identified lo-
calities as the chief threat of governmental power run amok, Cooley
viewed state legislatures as the chief source of governmental abuse.
Cooley's distrust of state legislatures derived from his Jacksonian dis-
approval of "special interests." He believed (with considerable justifica-
tion) that special interests had "captured" late nineteenth century state
legislatures. 28 5 For Cooley (as for the conservative Burger Court ma-
jority), the Anglo-Saxon tradition of self-government was America's
best hope of reining in unruly government and preserving American
freedoms.2 86 This Section first discusses Cooley's politics and jurispru-
dence, and then explains how his theory of inherent local government
sovereignty functioned as a political forum-shifting argument.
A. Distrusting Power and Revering Liberty: The Jacksonian Core of
Cooley's Thought
28 7
"The power of legislation, and the power of aggregated capi-
tal, sometimes one and sometimes the other, has (sic) been at
the work of oppression and robbery. As against the masses,
they have always been hand in hand."
John Pierce, Michigan radical consistently praised by Cooley
in the 1850's.288
"The Lawyer is and should be conservative ... the path of
wisdom is to keep an eye on old landmarks."
Cooley during the Civil War.2 89
285. M. MEYERS, supra note 61, at 17 ("A wealthy planter needs no editorial or legislative
hired hand; a wealthy banker of this era cannot do without them, where incorporation requires
special charter grants"). See also G. VAN DEUsEN, THE JACKSONIAN ERA 103 (1959); R. HoF-
STADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 57-61 (1977).
286. Cooley's inherent right to self-government is actually one of a number of constitu-
tional limitations designed to rein in unruly government. See infra text accompanying notes 331-
48.
287. The phrase "distrusting power and revering liberty" is from Paludan, supra note 36
at 606.
288. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
STATE OF MICHIGAN, 1850, 659 (Lansing, 1850), quoted in Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and "Laissez-
faire Constitutionalism": A Reconsideration, 53 J. AM. HIST. 751, 755 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism].
289. Cooley, Address on the Dedication of the Law Lecture Hall (Ann Arbor, 1863),
quoted in Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, supra note 288, at 758.
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Dillon, Brennan and the Burger Court majority can be categorized
as "liberals" or "conservatives" in the modern sense of each term with
only a limited amount of oversimplification; Cooley cannot. 290 Cooley
combined elements that today seem clearly liberal with other elements
that seem unmistakably conservative.
Dillon was the ideal type of a corporate lawyer in the Gilded Age,
who made it his business to know more about his clients' business than
they did. His grasp of the financial aspects of railroad and other busi-
ness deals was highly valued. 29' Cooley, on the other hand, was not
interested in finance, nor in fact in business at all, except as it was impli-
cated in his consuming passion: government. 292
290. See supra note 49.
291. See GREEN BAG, supra note 53, at 447:
A prominent banker who frequently has occasion to obtain Judge Dillon's opinion of the
legal aspects of his financial transactions is always desirous to know what the judge
thinks of the matter in hand from the business side. "Ask the Judge," he would instruct
his representative, "what he thinks of the 'deal' as an investor; would he put his own
money in the venture?"
See also C. FAIRMAN, supra note 67, at 923.
292. Until 1960, Cooley was consistently interpreted as an ally of the robber barons by
historians in the Progressive historiographical tradition, see, e.g., C. JACOBS, supra note 49, at 27
(1954). See also B. Twiss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: How LAISSEZ-FAIRE CAME TO THE
SUPREME COURT 18-41 (1942); S. FINE, supra note 49, at 127-30, 142-44 (1956); E. CORWIN, LIB-
ERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 137-38 (1948); C. HAINES, supra note 86, at 127-34.
In the early 1960's Professor Alan Jones offered a revisionist interpretation of Cooley in his
dissertation and three articles that grew out of it. Jones, The Constitutional Conservatism of
Thomas McIntyre Cooley (unpublished Ph.D. dissert., Univ. of Michigan, 1960); Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism, supra note 288; Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, 81 POLIT. Sci. Q. 602 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Cooley and the ICC]; Jones, Thomas M.
Cooley and the Michigan Supreme Court: 1865-1885, 10 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 97 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Cooley and Michigan Supreme Court]. Jones' work was used by Harold Hyman in his
acclaimed book on Reconstruction. H. HYMAN, supra note 49. Hyman's thesis is that the Civil War
opened up the possibility of vastly expanded governmental power, but that a generation of lawyers
(including Cooley and Dillon) ensured that this new potential was never realized. While Hyman
showed an awareness of Jones' work, id. at 372-75, he stressed Cooley's conservatism, id. at 354-
55, 516-19, 537, in contrast to Jones, who stressed Cooley's adherence to political positions today
associated with liberalism, e.g., his adherence to equal rights.
The most recent historian to consider Cooley's life and work is Phillip Paludan, see
Paludan, supra note 36; P. PALUDAN, A CONVENANT WITH DEATH 249-81 (1975). Paludan, a stu-
dent of Hyman, repeats Hyman's basic question: why did Reconstruction fail to deliver to blacks
the equality promised by the abolitionist movement? Paludan, in effect, generalized Jones' inter-
pretation of Cooley, as a man whose Jacksonian preconceptions severely limited his ability to deal
with Gilded Age problems, into an interpretation of an entire generation. See Cooley and Michigan
Supreme Court, at 111-120 (equal rights, freedom of the press).
Thus, Jones' interpretation of Cooley seems established in the historical literature, but its
implications remain largely unexamined by constitutional scholars, who continue to treat Cooley's
theory of constitutional limitations as indistinguishable from the Supreme Court's Lochner era
jurisprudence. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 82, at 438-40. Tribe's failure to appreciate that Coo-
ley's theory of constitutional limitations was designed to accomplish political goals very different
from those it was ultimately used to accomplish is one instance of lawyers' persistent tendency to
overlook the way in which identical rhetoric is used by different generations to support very differ-
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Cooley's interest in law was an aspect of his interest in politics. He
came from a political family. His father was active at Democratic meet-
ings; his uncle ran for Congress on the Democratic ticket; a half-
brother wrote editorials in the political rhetoric of the radical "loco-
foco" wing of the Democratic party. Cooley carried on the family tradi-
tion with a long-standing commitment to loco-foco principles. For his
first ten years in Michigan, Cooley's interest in literary and political
pursuits seems to have been stronger than his commitment to his legal
career.293 His position as editor for two radical Democratic newspa-
pers and his other political activities may well have hindered his success
as a lawyer, just as similar activities twenty years later may have cost
him a seat on the United States Supreme Court.2 9 4
Cooley's career differed markedly from Dillon's in ways that high-
light the differences between them. Whereas Dillon resigned a federal
judgeship to practice corporate law, Cooley neither enjoyed nor was
notably successful in law practice.295 For the bulk of his career Cooley
divided his time between teaching, publication, and his position as jus-
tice of the Michigan Supreme Court.2 9 6 Like Dillon, Cooley was in-
volved with railroads. But Cooley didn't represent them, he regulated
them, as the first chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
297
In the 1850's, Cooley as a "Progressive Democrat" advocated
ideas still associated today with American liberals: equal rights, free
ent goals. See supra note 88. Lawyers' retrospective oversimplification of doctrinal development
greatly limits their ability to spot and understand doctrines' manipulability.
293. Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, supra note 288, at 759.
294. Id. at 753. In contrast, Dillon was suitable for a federal judgeship because, during an
era when Republicans dominated national politics, Dillon was a lifelong "party regular" in the
Republican party. Dillon joined the Republican party when it was the antislavery party, and con-
tinued to feel comfortable with the G.O.P. as it became increasingly allied with big business and
the wealthy in the post-civil war period. Cooley's alliances with national parties were somewhat
fragile. He began as a Free Soil Democrat. He changed to the Republican party during the 1850's
when the Democratic party became the party of slavery, but became increasingly uneasy with the
G.O.P. in the late 19th century. In fact, some of Cooley's anti-corporate decisions while on the
Michigan Supreme Court probably contributed to the breaking of the Republican machine in the
1870's, and a movement arose to draft him to run for governor as the candidate of a coalition of
Democrats and Liberal Republicans. Id. at 106-08. Evidence suggests that none of this free think-
ing endeared him to party regulars.
295. Knowlton, Thomas McIntyre Cooley, 5 MICH. L. REv. 309, 312 (1906).
296. Id. at 313. In his later years Cooley moved away from legal scholarship towards
political science and history. In 188 1, Cooley began to teach in the school of political science. In
1884 he gave up his position on the law faculty; the following year he accepted a position in the
literary department teaching American history and constitutional law. 4 DICTIONARY OF NA-
TIONAL BIOGRAPHY 392 (1930).
297. Cooley was appointed to the ICC as a symbol of integrity that both the railroads and
the public could trust. Cooley and the ICC, supra note 292, at 612. At first, Cooley's Jacksonian
percepts impeded his ability to make the Commission's work effective. Gradually, however, Coo-
ley proved willing to take severe sanctions against the railroads. Id. at 616-19. See infra note 328
and accompanying text. Note that Hyman glosses over all of this. H. HYMAN, supra note 49, at
354-55.
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speech, and hostility to privileged. and powerful corporate interests.298
These values persisted throughout Cooley's life. After the Civil War, his
focus on equal rights led him to champion the rights of newly emanci-
pated blacks.29 9 Cooley was also extremely supportive of freedom of
the press. He played a major role in a series of Michigan Supreme Court
decisions constricting the liability of newspapers on first amendment
grounds, and noted, with justifiable pride, in 1883:300 "No court has
gone further than has this in upholding the privileges of the press, and
very few so far."
30 1
Cooley's apprehension about the risk that powerful corporations
would distort political processes also sounds quite modern. In an 1871
description of the Dartmouth College case,3 °2 Cooley noted that the
case had created "the most enormous and threatening powers in our
country. Some of the great and wealthy corporations," he noted, "have
greater influence in the country and upon the legislation of the country
than the states to which they owe their corporate existence. '"303 Cooley
warned his students of the "struggle between the power of corporations
and the rights of the people."-
30 4
Much of Cooley's language sounds familiar because it is part of an
American political tradition that dates back to the Jacksonian era.305
Yet, the values and the rhetoric Cooley shared with modern liberals
should not blur important differences between contemporary liberalism
and Cooley's social vision in its original context.
One hallmark of contemporary liberalism that Cooley did not
share is its hostility to laissez-faire.30 6 Cooley was a staunch advocate
of free market principles. His advocacy of laissez-faire was part of his
Jacksonian antipathy toward "special interests," a term used to refer to
the wealthy and powerful corporations that dominated state legisla-
298. Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, supra note 288, at 754-55.
299. See, e.g., People ex rel. Workman v. Board of Educ. of Detroit, 18 Mich. 399 (1869)
(Cooley decision upholding black child's right to a free public school education); Cooley and Mich-
igan Supreme Court, supra note 292, at 119-20.
300. See Atkinson v. Detroit Free Press Co., 44 Mich. 383 (1881) (Cooley, J., dissenting);
Miner v. Detroit Post and Tribune, 49 Mich. 338 (1882); Maclean v. Scripps, 52 Mich. 254 (1883),
cited in Cooley and Michigan Supreme Court, supra note 292, at 116-17.
301. Id. at 117.
302. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 250 (1819).
303. See Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, supra note 288, at 756.
304. Id. Cooley's hostility to corporations is one major difference between him and Dil-
lon. Another is Cooley's hostility to judicial review. See Cooley and Michigan Supreme Court,
supra note 292, at 109-13. Jones points out that Cooley's distrust ofjudicial review is itself enough
to disqualify Cooley's jurisprudence from being laissez-faire constitutionalism. See Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism, supra note 288.
305. Much "progressive" rhetoric passed from progressive Jacksonian Democrats to the
late 19th century Progressives, through the New Deal, to present day liberals.
306. The hostility to laissez-faire dates from the New Deal. See S. FINE, supra note 49, at
167-372, 397.
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tures for their own pecuniary gain.3 °7 One example of special interests'
abuse that particularly troubled Cooley was the success railroads had in
financing their endeavors through publicly issued bonds.
Once again we return to bonding. For an appreciation of Cooley's
attitude towards municipal bonding, additional background is in order
on the "transportation revolution" of the nineteenth century. The prior
discussion told only the second half of the story, 08 for railroad compa-
nies did not begin by aspiring to municipal issuance of their bonds.
Early entrepreneurs went first to state legislatures, and the states them-
selves played the major role in financing canals and railroads in the
early decades of the nineteenth century. 30 9 As a result, after the severe
panic of 1837, over one hundred million dollars worth of state bonds
were outstanding. Many projects defaulted, and the solvency of a sub-
stantial number of states was severely strained.3 10
An immediate outcome was a rash of state constitutional provi-
sions prohibiting states from issuing railroad bonds. 31  By midcentury,
virtually all states in the Union were forbidden from issuing bonds in
aid of railroads or other projects.3 12 Yet, the prohibitions on state in-
volvement proved an empty victory, for soon the "special interests"
had obtained authorization from state legislatures to allow municipali-
ties to issue railroad bonds.
313
To Cooley, the railroadmen's maneuver proved the loco-foco
premise that unlimited legislative power resulted in the exploitation of
the many for the benefit of the few. 314 Laissez-faire to Cooley meant
that the legislature should stay out of the economy because "when the
State once enters upon the business of subsidies, we shall not fail to
discover that the strong and powerful interests are those most likely to
control legislation, and that the weaker will be taxed to enhance the
307. For a general introduction to the Jacksonian era's hostility to "special interests," see
M. MEYERS, supra note 61.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 61-65.
309. The most famous example was the Erie Canal, financed in large part by the state of
New York. A. HEINS, CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS AGAINST STATE DEBT 3-6 (1963).
310. Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, supra note 288, at 755. Of the one hundred million
dollars debt, over forty million dollars was attributed to railroad building, the remaining sixty
million to canal building. A. HEINS, supra note 309, at 6-7; G. TAYLOR, supra note 61, at 92.
311. Pinsky, State Constitutional Limitations on Public Industrial Financing: An Historical
and Economic Approach, I I I U. PA. L. REV. 265, 277-82 (1963) (discussing emergence of state
constitutional limitations on public financial assistance to private enterprise).
312. A. HEINS, supra note 309, at 8-9; Pinsky, supra note 311, at 277-78; G. TAYLOR, supra
note 61, at 375-78.
313. R. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION, 1784-1855:
BROADENING THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC SERVICE DURING INDUSTRIALIZATION 206-08 (1982); Wal-
dron, Sharpless v. Philadelphia: Jeremiah Black and the Parent Case on the Public Purpose of Taxa-
tion, 1953 Wls. L. REV. 48, 49.
314. Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, supra note 288, at 755 (documenting loco-foco
premise).
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profits of the stronger." '315 Cooley expressed his version of laissez-faire
in classic Jacksonian rhetoric: "The State can have no favorites. Its bus-
iness is to protect the industry of all, and to give all the benefit of equal
laws." 3 16
Thus, Cooley's intense disapproval of municipalities' issuance of
railroad bonds was an outgrowth of his Jacksonian tenets. This is am-
ply illustrated by his controversial decision in People v. Salem,3 17 in
which Cooley (as had Dillon one year earlier) 318 struck down munici-
pal railroad bonds as unconstitutional. From a doctrinal standpoint,
the two decisions were similar, but the differences between the two far
outweigh those similarities. While Dillon formulated the issue as in-
volving a clash between governmental power and property rights,3 19
Cooley's opinion reflects his Jacksonian view that legislatures' authori-
zation of railroad bonding was one example among many of legisla-
tures' pandering to special interests:
[T]he discrimination by the state between different classes of
occupations, and the favoring of one at the expense of the
rest, whether that one be farming, or banking, merchandising
or milling, printing or railroading, is not legitimate legisla-
tion, and is an invasion of that equality of right and privilege
which is a maxim of State government.32 °
Not only did Cooley's rhetoric differ from Dillon's; Cooley's deci-
sion also had a very different substantive impact on the parties in-
volved. People v. Salem invalidated bonds already issued, and in doing
so destroyed the value of seven million dollars worth of outstanding
bonds. 321 Dillon's decision did nothing of the kind. Hanson v. Vernon
did not involve any bonds actually issued; it only declared unconstitu-
tional a state statute authorizing issuance of bonds in the future.3 22
Cooley was not disturbed by invalidation of outstanding bonds,
because such invalidation vindicated the rights of the many and
thwarted special interests who had used undue influence to procure au-
thorization of the bonds. Dillon, on the other hand, felt that once
bonds had been issued creditors' rights should be respected. "(I)t will be
well," he said in his treatise, to hold municipalities to their bonds, "if it
shall teach municipalities the lesson that if, having the power to do so,
315. People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452, 487 (1870).
316. Id. at 486-87.
317. Id.
318. See supra notes 74-87 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
320. 20 Mich. at 486.
321. Cooley and Michigan Supreme Court, supra note 292, at 106.
322. Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa 28 (1869).
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they issue negotiable securities, they cannot escape if these find their
way into the hands of innocent purchasers. "323
B. Cooley's Post-Civil War Conservatism
The Civil War changed Thomas Cooley's social vision both di-
rectly and indirectly. His horror at the consequences of convulsive po-
litical change changed him directly by clipping the wings of his radical-
ism. Before the war, Cooley's self-image was (in modern terms) near-
Maoist:
[C]onservatives are a little out of date in this part of the coun-
try, and most of us think that everything in the moral and
political world as well as the physical is better torn down and
rebuilt every ten years.324
Amidst the slaughter of the 1860's Cooley's passion for convulsive
change was markedly diminished. "The lawyer is and should be con-
servative," he stated in 1863, "the path of wisdom is to keep an eye on
the old landmarks, particularly the common law." Yet it should be
noted that Cooley did not stop there: "In the life of nations," he contin-
ued, "conservatism and progress must be found to go hand in hand;
and the lawyer, instead of opposing all change and living as much as
possible in the past, must be awake to the living present, and hopeful of
the future.",
325
Cooley proved as good as his word, when, after the Civil War,
certain of his Jacksonian preconceptions were sorely tried by the Gilded
Age. The two great tasks facing American government during this per-
iod were control over corporate interests and equality for freed slaves.
Neither could be accomplished without a massive increase in the exer-
cise of federal power,326 which Cooley resisted on two grounds. First,
such an increase required radical innovation, a prospect that frightened
Cooley after the Civil War. Second, an increase in government power
contradicted Cooley's Jacksonian precept of negative government: the
belief that the government's duty was to keep its citizens from injuring
323. See J. DILLON, supra note 4, at Sec. 416. Fairman points out that the third parties
who bought the bonds, far from being "innocent," were in fact speculators who bought large
quantities of defaulted paper at deep discounts. C. FAIMAN, supra note 67, at 924-25.
324. Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, supra note 288, at 754.
325. Cooley, Address on the Dedication of the Law Lecture Hall (Ann Arbor, 1863),
quoted in Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, supra note 288, at 758.
326. See Paludan, supra note 36, at 598-601.
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each other, and otherwise to "leave them free to regulate their own pur-
suits of industry and improvements." 32
Ultimately, towards the end of his life, Cooley began to acknowl-
edge the need for increased federal power to control corporate interests.
As the first chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC),
Cooley gradually concluded that effective control of railroads in the
public interest required exercise of direct federal authority.32 Cooley's
experience at the ICC was the culmination of much he found unsettling
about the Gilded Age. One scholar has linked Cooley's self-described
"despondency" and his breakdown in 1889 with inner strain produced
by the inadequacy of his pre-Civil War social vision to handle the prob-
lems of a rapidly industrializing and urbanizing era.329
This assessment of Cooley's political outlook shows that he was
neither a liberal nor a conservative according to modern definitions.
Moreover, it shows that Cooley was not apprehensive about govern-
mental abuse by municipalities (as was Dillon) nor by the federal gov-
ernment (as are modern conservatives), but by state government. The
following section shows that Cooley's theory of constitutional limita-
tions, and his doctrine of the inherent sovereignty of localities, can be
viewed as political forum-shifting arguments designed to control state
legislatures.
C. Cooley's Inherent Right to Local Self-government as a Political
Forum-Shifting Argument
Cooley published his Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations
'Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American
Union in 1868. The book went through six editions, sold more copies
and was more frequently cited than any other book on American law
published in the last half of the nineteenth century.33 It became, in the
words of one historian, "America's second constitution.,
331
Although Cooley's treatise was used by Dillon and others as the
raw material for laissez-faire constitutionalism, 332 the book itself is
best understood as an attempt to rein in state government. The book's
central premise, apparent from its title, is that constitutional rights are
327. See S. FINE, supra note 49, at 3-4 (discussion of the "negative state"). The Jacksoni-
ans inherited the concept of negative government from the Jeffersonians. (The definition quoted is
Jefferson's, quoted in Paludan, supra note 36, at 601). See also id. at 602, 614.
328. Cooley and the ICC, supra note 292, at 616-21.
329. See Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, supra note 288, at 771 n.79. Compare Paludan,
supra note 36, at 103-41 (Paludan implies that Cooley never gained any appreciation of his ideas'
unsuitability in the post-Civil War period).
330. Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, supra note 288, at 759.
331. See Paludan, supra note 36, at 598.
332. See C. JACOBS, supra note 49, at 98.
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best assured by limitations on the states. This premise was a change
from the founders' original conception, expressed in the Bill of Rights,
that the centralized power of the federal government was the primary
threat to traditional liberties. In 1868, Cooley's change seemed apt for
both prospective and retrospective reasons. Prospectively, Cooley's
conception provided a central role for the fourteenth amendment in
post-Civil War jurisprudence.3 33 Cooley's assumption that states pre-
sented the primary threat to freedom was readily molded into a consti-
tutionalism that mobilized the fourteenth amendment to limit states'
efforts at business regulation.3 3 4
Yet Cooley's novel conception of the constitution was motivated
not by these prospective concerns with a laissez-faire future, but by ret-
rospective concerns generated by his Jacksonian past. Cooley consid-
ered the chief threat to freedom and prosperity to be not state legisla-
tures' regulatory enactments, but their tendency to be captured by
powerful corporate interests. In 1870, Cooley still used Jacksonian im-
agery to describe abuse by state legislatures: "The source of danger is in
a few men having so much moneyed power. They can make great con-
solidations. They are able to exercise more influence over the state legis-
latures than both political parties.",3 3'  Nearly fifteen years later Coo-
ley's basic vision remained unchanged. While defending most
capitalists, he decried "robbers and plunderers" and warned that "pov-
erty is never so much in danger of becoming master as when capital
unjustly manipulates the legislation of the country. "336
Cooley gave a more systematic statement of his distrust of state
legislatures in 1878. "The American people," Cooley began, "conferred
no unlimited authority."'3 3 7 Cooley reminded the reader of various
constitutional limitations, and then discussed their raison d'etre in
terms that would have sounded quite foreign to the founding fathers
338
but that are resonant of Cooley's nineteenth century concerns. The ba-
sic goal of constitutions, according to Cooley, is to rein in errant legisla-
tures. "It must be conceded," Cooley admitted, "that in the original
establishment of American constitutions no special distrust of legisla-
tive bodies was manifested.... But the country was not slow to discover
the need of some other check upon representatives than that which was
afforded in frequent elections.",
3 3 9
333. See generally B. Twiss, supra note 292; C. HAINES, supra note 86, at 143-65; E.
CORWIN, supra note 292, at 116-68.
334. See supra note 332.
335. Cooley and the ICC, supra note 292, at 605.
336. Id. at 608.
337. Cooley, Limits to State Control of Private Business, 54 PRINCETON REV. 233 (1878)
[hereinafter cited as State Limits on Business].
338. See G. WOODS, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 343-63 (1969).
339. State Limits on Business, supra note 337, at 234.
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Cooley then recited an early case of legislative fraud, but only as a
warm-up to his major instance of legislative abuse.
[B]y far the larger part of all the doubtful legislation which the
history of the country presents has taken place since the year
1846 .... The legislation in aid of private individuals and
corporations would first attract attention, not only because of
its magnitude, but because around it has clustered much that
was questionable, and not a little that proved to be
corrupt.34 o
Cooley mentioned municipal assistance to railroads as a particularly
prevalent offense, and began an extended discussion before he caught
himself, noting, "The evils that have resulted from such legislation [au-
thorizing municipal bonds], equally with the incidental benefits, are for-
eign to the present discussion" (as indeed they were). 34'
For Cooley, as for Dillon, outrage about railroad bonding is essen-
tial background for understanding his political forum-shifting argu-
ments. Both men cared deeply about bonding, yet their concerns led
them to quite different conclusions. Dillon disapproved of municipal
bonding because it was, in his view, exactly the kind of governmental
interference that would disrupt the economy. 342 Hence, for Dillon, the
optimal solution was to limit not only the ability of municipalities to
issue bonds, but also their governmental authority in general, so that
towns interfered with the market neither by regulating business, enact-
ing taxes, nor providing services. For Cooley, the issuance of railroad
bonds by municipalities-invariably authorized by state legislatures-
was merely the most egregious example of class legislation for "special
interests." For Cooley, therefore, the larger solution was not to rein in
municipalities, but to control state legislatures. His theory of local gov-
ernment sovereignty was one of a number of doctrines designed to ac-
complish this goal.343
340. Id. at 236.
341. Id. at 237.
342. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
343. Cooley's theory of inherent municipal sovereignty in particular, and his constitu-
tional theory in general, can be viewed as part of an on-going Jacksonian strategy to limit the
power of state legislatures that began with the state constitutional conventions of the 1840's. These
conventions, often dominated by radical Jacksonian Democrats, replaced earlier state constitu-
tions with new ones that contained detailed limitations on state legislative power. See Laissez-
Faire Constitutionalism, supra note 288, at 755 (documenting mid-century constitutional conven-
tions). Cooley's constitutional theory continued this Jacksonian strategy, merely changing the
focus of political activism from constitutional conventions to the courts. Cooley's theory crystal-
lized a series of constitutional limitations on state legislatures as the basic framework of constitu-
tional law. Some were written into the federal or the state constitutions or both. But Cooley's
major innovation was his assertion that other important constitutional limitations were unwritten
ones. See CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 35, at 85, 129; Cooley, Comparative Merits of
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Cooley's theory of inherent local sovereignty did not deny that the
state had the authority to set up municipalities and even to appoint
some city officers on an initial and provisional basis. Where Cooley and
Dillon diverged was on the breadth of states' control over functioning
municipal governments. Dillon concluded that state control was virtu-
ally unlimited, and gave states the authority to replace city officers or
even to abolish city governments altogether. Cooley disagreed. In The
People ex rel. LeRoy v. Hurlbut,344 Cooley wrote that "The right in the
state is a right, not to run and operate the machinery of local govern-
ment, but to provide for it and put it in motion."3 45 Hurlbut involved
the question of whether the state legislature could establish a board of
public works for Detroit and appoint not only its initial but also its
permanent members. For Dillon, the answer would have been easy: yes,
because the city is the creature of the state. Cooley framed the issue
quite differently: "The question, broadly and nakedly stated can be
nothing short of this: Whether local self-government in this state is or is
not a mere privilege, conceded by the legislature in its discretion, and
which may be withdrawn at any time at pleasure?" '346 Cooley answered
no:
The state may mould local institutions according to its views
of policy and expediency; but local government is a matter of
absolute right; and the state cannot take it away. It would be
the boldest mockery to speak of a city as possessing municipal
liberty where the state not only shaped its government, but at
its discretion sent in its own agents to administer it; or to call
that system one of constitutional freedom under which it
should be equally admissible to allow the people full control
in their local affairs, or no control at all.347
The context of Hurlbut illustrates the Jacksonian roots of Cooley's
principle of inherent local government sovereignty. The case arose
when the state legislature attempted to control appointments to a com-
mission with substantial power over city funds and city patronage.
Thus, Hurlbut involved exactly the kind of grasping by special interests
Written and Unwritten Constitutions, 23 AM. L. REV. 311 (1889) (Cooley concludes unwritten con-
stitutions are better).
One important such limitation was the public purpose doctrine, which Cooley had invented
to end municipal issuance of railroad bonds. The principle of inherent local sovereignty was
another.
344. 24 Mich. 44(1871).
345. Id. at 110.
346. Id. at 95-96.
347. Id. at 108.
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that raised Cooley's Jacksonian ire.34 In decisions after Hurlbut, Coo-
ley generally deferred to the state legislature, but he included strong
dicta reiterating the doctrine of inherent local government sover-
eignty.3 4 9 Thus, the doctrine remained as a potential check on the state
legislature in contexts where special interests' behavior proved suffi-
ciently outrageous.
This analysis shows that Cooley's theory of inherent municipal
sovereignty was only secondarily an attempt to empower localities
themselves. Like Dillon's formulation of city status and the Burger
Court's local sovereignty principle, it was primarily a political forum-
shifting argument. Whereas Dillon wanted to shift power away from
localities, and the Burger Court majority wants to shift power away
from the federal government, Cooley's theory was designed to shift
power away from state legislatures "captured" by special interests.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL VULNERABILITY OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
This Article suggests that each of the four major formulations of
city status was motivated by an agenda concerning government power.
Dillon's theory that cities are creatures of the state was a by-product of
his desire to limit government interference in the economy.35 ° Cooley's
theory of inherent local sovereignty reflected his desire to limit the ma-
nipulation of government by special interests.35 ' The Burger Court's
quasi-constitutional principle of local sovereignty stems from contem-
porary conservatives' desire to constrict the size and power of "big gov-
ernment.",352 Brennan's formulation of city status in the municipal 1ia-
348. One useful way to view Cooley's doctrine is as a weapon courts could use in so-called
"ripper cases," see supra note 45, in which Republican legislatures "ripped" powers away from
Democratic localities. A classic "ripper" case occurred in Michigan in 1865. People v. Mahaney,
13 Mich. 481 (1865), concerned a situation where the legislature replaced Detroit's police chief
with a state superintendent of police. Similar incidents occurred in many states. (An early, classic
example was People v. Draper, 15 N.Y. 522 (1852)). The reason: the police force was a rich source
of patronage, which legislatures wanted to wrest from cities. Cooley was not far off the mark in
viewing cases such as Mahaney and Hurlbut as instances where the legislature was captured by
special interests.
349. E.g., Board of Park Comm'rs v. Common Council of Detroit, 28 Mich. 227, 240
(1873) ("it is a fundamental principle in this state ... that the people ofevery hamlet, town and city
of the State are entitled to the benefits of local self-government"); People v. Common Council of
Detroit, 29 Mich. 108 (1874). Note that in both cases, Cooley ultimately upheld the legislature's
action, influenced presumably by his belief in a narrow scope of judicial review. Cooley's inherent
sovereignty discussions in each case are clearly dicta.
350. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 314-29 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 101-17 and accompanying text.
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bility cases is designed to allow redress of governmental intrusions on
individual rights.35 3
When juxtaposed with these four major theories of city status,
Frug's analysis in The City as a Legal Concept3 54 has certain familiar
elements. Like Cooley, Dillon, Brennan, and the Burger Court major-
ity, Frug is drawn to an analysis of city status by an agenda concerning
government power in general. Frug, writing as part of the critical legal
studies movement, argues for a reimagined city that, by functioning as a
participatory democracy, will eliminate the alienation that (he feels)
pervades life in late capitalist society.
3 55
Though Frug's interpretation parallels those of the other authors
studied, it also differs in a basic way. Cooley, Dillon, Brennan and the
Burger Court all share an apprehension about the potential for abuse
inherent in powerful government. This fear is a persistent element in
American political ideology, 356 and American municipal law has been
shaped by it. In sharp contrast to the four other authors, Frug focuses
not upon his fears, but upon his aspirations for public power. He rejects
the long-standing American distrust of government in favor of a re-
formist attitude that exalts government's potential to create a new
society.357
In this effort, Frug represents the third generation of twentieth
century reformers who have sought to reformulate city status as a first
step in redefining the body politic in order to solve pressing social prob-
lems. At the turn of the century, the Progressives aspired to reshape the
city into an institution run by experts, whose knowledge and vision
would solve urban problems that had resulted from industrialization
and immigration. 35 In the 1960's, Great Society activists renewed and
updated the Progressives' belief that America's most pressing social
353. See supra notes 210-15 and accompanying text.
354. Frug, supra note 30.
355. Id. at 1068-73. Frug has since developed his critique of bureaucracy in Frug, The
Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984). He continues to view
participatory democracy as the chief alternative to bureaucracy, and to view bureaucracy as "the
primary target for those who seek liberation from modern forms of human domination." Id. at
1295. Frug's alienation critique is in the Marxist tradition, see Frug, supra note 30.
His romance with participatory democracy derives from a New Left agenda established in
the 1960's, see J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY viii-ix (1980). Frug takes the
virtue of participatory democracy as a given. (Compare Mansfield's extremely sophisticated analy-
sis of the potential of participatory democracy: she analyzes (as Frug does not) its potential
strengths and weaknesses in various concrete contexts.)
356. See S. FINE, supra note 49, at 3-4, 9-14.
357. Id. at 167-68. Most people today associate this reformist tradition with the New
Deal.
358. See F. HOWE, THE CITY - THE HOPE OF DEMOCRACY xv-xix, 2 (1967) (originally
published in 1901) (description of Progressive vision). The historiography of the Progressives and
the city is, of course, immense. For a classic discussion, see R. LuBOVE, THE PROGRESSIVES AND THE
SLUMs: HOUSING REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY 1890-1917 (1962).
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problems could be solved by redesigning city governments to give cities
more power. 3 59 Frug's proposal to reshape the city into a participatory
democracy is the latest manifestation of this tradition, which for nearly
a century has viewed cities as "the hope of democracy.",
360
American reformers' romance with the city is one aspect of what
could be called the whore/madonna syndrome in American local gov-
ernment: the tendency of American intellectuals to caricature cities in a
schematized way as either the hope or the downfall of virtue in govern-
ment. The negative branch of the syndrome was elegantly documented
by Morton and Lucia White in their famous study The Intellectual Ver-
sus the City.361 Frug's The City as a Legal Concept brings this tradition
into the legal literature, in its positive ("madonna") mode. The ten-
dency of American courts to use city status as a proxy for their attitude
towards governmental power is thus a specialized example of a broader
tendency among American intellectuals to project onto cities their fears
and aspirations about government.
The question that remains is whether this tendency has consis-
tently redounded to cities' detriment. It has not. Cities have had some
victories, and exist today as units of government that exercise substan-
tial regulatory power and provide important services. 362 Though Frug
takes city powerlessness as axiomatic, his approach is unpersuasive be-
cause he fails to distinguish between the ideology of city powerlessness
and the question of whether cities in fact are powerless.363 Cities are
not "powerless," though their constitutional position has made them
vulnerable in a way quite different from that Frug suggests.
359. See J. TEAFORD, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICAN CITY (1985);
360. F. HOWE, supra note 358.
361. M. & L. WHITE, supra note 125. Actually, the Whites documented both branches of
the whore/madonna syndrome. Though they focused upon American intellectuals' hostility
towards the city, they also acknowledged "it is now [1961] fashionable for many American intellec-
tuals to express tender concern for the city's future." Id. at 1. Intellectuals' negative attitude
towards the city stemmed from a number of elements. Apprehensions about the dramatic changes
precipitated by industrialization and immigration played a role, as did the abiding American mis-
trust of governmental power. For examples of judicial suspicion of local decisionmaking in the
land use context, see D. MANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEMMA 104 (1971); Sullivan, From Kroner to
Fasano: An Analysis of Judicial Review of Land Use Regulation in Oregon, 10 WILLAMETTE L.J. 358,
364-66 (1974); Tarlock, Consistency with Adopted Land Use Plans as a Standard of Judicial Review:
The Case Against, 9 URB. L. ANN. 69, 75, 88-101 (1975). For a discussion of the Federalist roots of
the American distrust of power exercised at a local level, see Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piece-
meal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837, 855-57 (1983).
362. See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 25, at 8
(Table 2) (documenting municipal expenditures for education, highways, public welfare, housing/
urban renewal). Cities also exercise important regulatory functions.
363. Frug's assertion that cities are powerless follows a discussion of various legal restric-
tions on cities, including the basic principle that cities have no inherent sovereignty. Frug, supra
note 30, at 1062-66. Later in the article, Frug finds it "tempting" to link the "crisis in the cities"
with "city powerlessness," id. at 1067, though he does not at that point (and never does) analyze
the actual powers cities exercise, as opposed to the legal ideology of city powerlessness.
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Cities are more vulnerable than states and the federal government
because they occupy a different constitutional position.364 The Consti-
tution provides a framework for American political discourse that dis-
tinguishes to a substantial extent between the question of whether any
level of government should exercise a particular power and the question
of which level of government will do so. In discussions of city power
these two questions rarely have been adequately separated. Courts con-
sidering city status have tended to submerge questions concerning the
proper role of cities, to focus instead on agendas concerning govern-
ment power in general.
Take for example Brennan's municipal liability cases, in which lo-
calities have been subjected to potentially massive antitrust and section
1983 liability in contexts in which the state and federal governments are
immune. The cases involve a difficult question: Do the differences be-
tween the resources and responsibilities of localities and those of other
levels of government make liability appropriate at the municipal but
not at the state or federal levels? Astonishingly, this question is never
fully addressed. In the cases involving section 1983 liability, it is never
even mentioned. Justice Brennan does discuss the peculiar characteris-
tics of municipalities in his antitrust opinions, but his analysis is neither
sustained nor convincing.365
The absence of thoughtful discussion in American law about the
role of cities qua cities within the federal structure is characteristic not
only of the municipal liability cases, but of all four formulations of city
status, and of the reformist tradition as well. The constitutional vulner-
ability of cities stems not so much from a consistently hostile attitude
towards American cities, as from a tendency to decide basic issues con-
cerning city status without reference to cities' peculiar resources and
responsibilities.
This venerable American tradition of deciding issues of city status
by default should be replaced by an effort to define a suitable role for
cities and other units of local government.366 In an age when seventy
percent of all Americans live in metropolitan areas, 367 and forty per-
364. See supra note 21.
365. For the most part, Brennan relied on past Courts' vague assertions that municipali-
ties should not be immune because they lack the "sovereignty" of states. Yet "sovereignty" is such
an empty term that Brennan's analysis is circular: are cities potentially liable because they are not
sovereign, or is one aspect of cities' lack of sovereignty their exposure to liability?
366. One glaring example is that courts have treated a wide variety of disparate entities-
from large urban centers to remote water districts-as "local government units" with the same
legal status as American cities. One threshold issue, never discussed, is whether such disparate
units should have the same status in American law.
367. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 24, at 19, 26.
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cent of all funds are spent at the local level,3 61 it is time to reconsider
the issue of city status on its merits.
368. See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 25, at 6.
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